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STi^TTCMENT 



MAJOR GENERAL BUELL, 



IN REVIEW 



EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMISSION, 



APPOINTED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT. 



IN NOVEMBER, 1862. 



CAMPAIGN IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, NOKTHEKN MISSISSIPPI 
AND NORTH ALABAMA IN 1861 AND 1862. 



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ERRATA. 

Vi\p;c G, conmioiK-ing on fij'lli line, vc:id: " Tf tlie expoditioiis should be 
thrciitened by a superior force, they were to unite under the protection of 
the gunboats and make tlieniselves seeiirc until released by my advance 
u])on Nashville." 

l^ige 10, sixth line, fifth word, read " that " instead of " the."" 
Page 11, fifteenth line, read "June" instead of " April. "" 
Page 13, fifteenth line, read "Tennessee" instead of " Mississipjii. " 
Page 8(), twenty-third line, read " Salvisa "" instead of "Saliva."' 
Page 4(3, seventh line, omit "of the enemy." 

Page 65, second line, read "Captain N. Michler " instead of "Captain 
M. Mickler." 

Page 65, sixth line, after "Adjutant General," add "Lieutenant C. L. 
Fitzhugh, Aid-de-camp." 




STATEMENT 

OF 

MAJOR GENERAL BUELL, 

IN REVIEW 

OF THE 

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE MILITARY COMMISSION. 



The investigations of this Commission have not gone further back than 
shortly after the evacuation of Corinth by Uie rebel array, in May last ; y/ /s_/ 
and it might, perhaps, be expected that this review of my command in 
Kentucky and Tennessee would not go beyond that period ; but I have, 
for more than a, year, remained silent, under misrepresentations which 
have misled the public mind with reference to the administration of my 
command. I deem it proper, therefore, to sketch, briefly, the history of the 
army I recently commanded, and of my connection with it, for the period 
anterior to the time to which this investigation has extended. It is proper, 
also, as bearing on subjects that have been investigated, because many 
circumstances connected with it shaped or affected the subsequent opera, 
tions under ray command. 

In the early part of November, 1861, the condition of affairs in Ken- 
tucky became the subject of the most anxious solicitude to the Government 
and throughout the country. One-third of the state was in the possession 
of the rebel forces, under whose protection a provisional government was 
inaugurated at Kussellville. It was supposed that the Union element was 
confined, for the most part, to the old men ; that the mass of the young 
men were on the eve of joining the rebel cause, and that nothing but extra- 
ordinary exertion and judicious management could rescue the state from 
the vortex toward which the excitement of revolution was rapidly carrying 
her. This was certainly au unjust reflection on the loyalty of the state ; 
but there is no doubt that the presence of a large rebel force rendered the 
occasion critical. 



It was unexpectedly announced to me, about the 9th of November, that 
I was to be charged with this weighty responsibility. 1 received general 
instructions from the General-in-Chief, Major-General McClellan, on the 
night of the 12th, and on the 15th of November I assumed command, at 
Louisville, of the new department of the Ohio, embracing the states of 
Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, that portion of Kentucky east of the Cumberland 
river, and the State of Tennessee. 

The enemy, under the command of General Sidney Johnson, was in 
possession of Bowling Green, with, according to the best information, 
about twenty-five thousand men, his advance guard extending to Mun- 
fordsville. Including Hopkinsville and other points, his force norlh of the 
Cumberland amounted probably to thirty-five thousand men. He had a 
small force at Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, and Fort Donelson, ou 
the Cumberland ; and he had railroad communication with Columbus, on 
the Mississippi, where he had a large force, and with Nashville and art 
points south and east. These facilities enabled him to concentrate at any 
point, in a very short time, all the force in the Confederacy not required 
for defence elsewhere. At that time he could hardly be said to be threat- 
ened in any quarter except in front of Washington. The Coast expeditions 
had not been inaugurated, and our force in Missouri was not yet prepared 
to operate beyond the limits of that state. He had also a small force, not 
probably exceeding two thousand five hundred men, under Humphrey 
Marshall, threatening the north-eastern part of Kentucky, through Pound 
Gap, and a considerable force under General Zollicoffer, at Cumberland 
Gap and on the road north of it. These last had recently been compelled 
to fall back from an attempt to invade the central part of the State, but 
they were still in a position to renew the effort. In addition to this, the 
population was in a state of great disquiet. Bands were constantly organ- 
izing to join the rebel ranks and intimidate the loyal people; and in some 
parts of the state the Union element scarcely dared to express itself. 

Kentucky at this time was the point which offered to the enemy the 
best prospect of advantage. His intention to have possession of Louisville 
within a limited period was constantly avowed. The disloyal element con. 
fidently expected it, and if the Government force had not been speedily in- 
creased, the attempt would no doubt have been made. As soon, however 
as the re-enforcements began to arrive, he commenced fortifying strongly at 
Bowling Green and other points. 

In reality, the effective Government force which 1 found in Kentucky 
consisted of two divisions, about twenty-three thousand men, on the Cum- 
berland Gap road and the Nashville road, and about four thousand men on 
the Bi"- Sandy, in the north-east part of the State; but there were besides some 
forty or more Kentucky regiments or fractions of regiments scattered over the 



State in i-ecruiting districts, that were more or less available for local service. 
Very many, in fact nearly all, of them were not yet mustered in; many 
without arms, equipments or proper organization; some of them embracing 
various arms of service, artillery, cavalry and infantry. In the whole force 
were included about eight field batteries and four regiments of cavalry 
The latter were all without any suitable arms — some had pistols only, and 
some muskets. There was not, I believe, a carbine in the hands of the 
troops. In the infantry, arms of two or three different calibers could fre- 
quently be found in the same regiment, and many of these were of foreign 
make and unfit for service from various defects which rendered thean unsafe 
or unreliable. Th«3 troops were but little instructed, some of them not at 
all, and four or five General and perhaps as many staff officers embraced 
the whole military experience in the Department. Officers having no rank 
whatever were acting as Generals and staff officers under conditioned prom- 
ises of appointment; and the supplies and equipment were in many respects 
deficient and defective. There was not transportation enough not already 
emploved to serve twenty thousand men two days' march from a depot or 
line of railroad. 

The first thing to be done was to organize, arm, equip and mobilize this 
heterogeneous mass; and this was both a difficult and tedious work. The 
Kentucky troops had to be collected from remote quarters and the fractions 
consolidated and organized — a work which the Military Board of the State 
had commenced before my arrival. Supplies of every kind had to be pro- 
cured — a difficult matter, owing to the quantity suddenly required to supply 
the enormous force the Government was calling into service. In a word, 
pretty much every thing necessary to make an army of soldiers had to be 
done. But little assistance could be obtained from abroad. Experienced 
staff officers could not be obtained. I expected two regular batteries 
from Missouri. About the first of January two companies of artillery, 
without batteries, making together about seventy men, with one officer, re- 
ported to me. The expectation of a regiment of regular cavalry resulted 
even worse than that. After my arrival at Nashville two companies reported 
with about seventy men. New regiments began to repoit occasionally very 
soon after my arrival, and from the 26th of November to the 1st of January 
several regiments that had seen some service joined from Western Virginia. 
About the last of December some fourteen raw regiments weie received from 
Ohio and Indiana. The force was afterward further increased from time to 
time. In the mean time, the enemy had also received considerable acces- 
sions to his strength. 

The organization of the troeps into Brigades and Divisions was effected 
without delay as fast as they arrived. It was made a rule in the organiza- 
tion not to group the regiments by states, but to represent as many States 



as possible in each brigade — an arrangement which was attended with the 
happiest results in the discipline and tone of the army. 

The instructions which I received, on leaving Washington, pressed 
upon me the importance of sending a column into East Tennessee. While 
the organization of ray army, and the preparation of transportation to 
enable it to move, were going on, I studied the subject very carefully, and 
also suggested a plan of caimpaign against Nashville, and expressed my 
views very fully to the General-in-Chief with reference to both. I said that 
the campaign to East Tennessee would give occupation to thirty thousand 
men — twenty thousand to enter the State, with a reserve of ten thousand 
on the line of communications ; and I stated what means would be re- 
quired to supply the force at such a distance — two hundred miles by wagon 
transportation, a good part of the way through a barren mountainous 
region. For a campaign against Nashville, I proposed to march rapidly 
again-it that city, passing to the left of Bowling Green, through Glasgow 
and Gallatin, while a force from Missouri should ascend the Cumberland 
river under the protection of gunboats. This was essential, because, to 
make the movement successful, it would be necessary to move very light, 
and depend on receiving supplies by the Cumberland river after getting 
through. In organizing my troops, I disposed them so that they could be 
directed upon either or both of these objects. By the last of December I 
had collected troops enough to organize four divisions — about forty thou- 
sand men. I had thrown one division forward to Munfordsville, one to 
Bacon creek, on the same road, one near Green river, on the New Haven 
turnpike, and had one at Lebanon. Many of the Kentucky troops were yet 
scattered and not mustered in, but in some cases two or more regiments had 
been brought together for local service, with as many regiments added 
from other states — as at Calhoun, where there weie perhaps six thousand 
men lor the protection of the Green river country, and at Columbia per- 
haps three thousand. Other new regiments were rendezvouing at Bards- 
town for organization and preparation for service. As yet the most 
strenuous efforts had not succeeded in obtaining the necessary means of 
transportation for an advance. 

About the middle of December Humphrey Marshall again invaded the 
state through Pikeville, with about twenty-five hundred men, though his 
force was represented at six or seven thousand. On the 17th I sent Colonel 
Garfield to take charge of a force of five regiments of infantry and about a 
regiment of cavalry, and operate against him. Marshall was defeated in 
two sharp engagements on the Big Sandy, near Prestonburg, and by about 
the middle of February was driven out of the State. 

Simultaneously with the advance of Marshall into North-eastern Kentucky 
General ZoUicoffer made his appearance on the Cumberland River, near 



Somerset. His force was represented at twelve thousand men, but probably 
did not exceed eight thousand. The force sent for that purpose and to ob- 
serve his movements failed to prevent him from crossing. I had pre- 
viously kept a regiment at Somerset, and ordered the erection of a small 
work, both to watch that route into the State and to prevent the shipment 
of coal to Nashville. Zollicoffer crossed at Mill Spring and intrenched him- 
self on the north bank of the river. On the 27th of December I ordered 
General Thomas to march from Lebanon and attack him in conjunction with 
the force already at Somerset, and at the same time sent two regiments of 
infantry and a battery of artillery to Jamestown to blockade the river, a 
steamer having already passed up with supplies for the enemy at Mill Spring. 
Want of transportation delayed General Thomas' departure until the 1st 
of January. The weather had previously been tolerably good, but that very 
day the rainy season set in, and from that time until near the end of March 
the earth was thoroughly saturated, and every stream was flooded. 'J'he 
season in that respect was remarkable. The difficulties of the march were 
so great that General Thomas only arrived at a position twelve miles from 
Mill Spring, and about seventy-five miles fri;m Lebanon, on the 18th. The 
enemy came out and attacked him at daylight on the morning of the 19th. 
The result was a signal victory to our arms. The enemy was pursued to 
his intrenchments, and during the night crossed the river. He lost a con- 
siderable number of men in killed, wounded and prisoners, fourteen pieces 
of artillery, some fourteen hundred animals, and a large amount of other 
property and stores. General Zollicoffer was among the killed. 

The battle of IMill Spring was at that time one of the most important 
that had occurred during the war, and the victory was, I believe, the first 
the LTnion arms achieved where the forces engaged were so large ; but the 
lack of transportation, and the condition of the roads rendered it impossi- 
ble to follow it up. 

Owing to the delay in procuring sufficient transportation for the 
expedition to East Tennessee, I had regarded the campaign against Nash- 
ville as the one which it would be necessary to enter upon first, in order to 
save time. I was waiting for the arrangement of the necessary concert 
between the forces on the Mississippi and my own to commence it, when, 
owing to the illness of the General-in-Chief, and at the request of the 
President, I wrote, on the 3d of January, to Major General Hallack, who 
was in command in Missouri, and proposed substantially the same plan I 
had submitted to the General-in-Chief, and substantially the same as that 
which afterwards resulted in the capture of Fort Henry, Fort Donelson 
and Nashville. It contemplated an advance upon Nashville through Ken- 
tucky, a strong demonstration, which might be converted into a real attack 
against Columbus, if the enemy should weaken that point to strengthen 



6 

otliers that were threatened, and an advance of twenty thousand men up 
the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, under the protection of gunboats. 
Such a force I deemed sufficient, at that time, for the works at Forts 
Henry and Donnelson had as yet no great strength, and were but feebly 
armed and garrisoned. I^ under the protection of the gunbotits^' the 
expeditions slK)liId~^e ^threatened by a superior force, they were to 
unitCijand make themselves secure until released by my advance upon 
Nashville. At that time I expected that the expedition already com- 
menced against the enemy at Mill Spring would be fully accomplished 
in ten days, and General Thomas' troops in a position to be available for 
other service. 

General Halleck replied to my proposition that he had not spare 
force enough to undertake it, and suggested the objection that the 
proposed operation was one upon outer lines, but he oflfered to make a 
demonstration from Paducah toward Columbus. These facts explain in 
part why I was not prepared to act as promptly as I could otherwise have 
done when General Hallack subsequently commenced his advance up the 
Tennessee river. He stated, also, that he hoped in a few weeks to be able 
to render me material assistance. A mere demonstration, not in sufficient 
force to take a decided part in the campaign would have been of no avail, 
because either my advance must be rapid directly against Nashville by 
flanking Bowling Green — an essential condition of which would be that I 
should meet supplies transported up the Cumberland — or else it must be 
deliberate, and with heavy artillery, against Bowling Green, strengthened 
as that position was by fortifications on both sides of Barren river; and I 
had not then the means necessary for such an operation. Besides, I re- 
ceived, about the same time, communications from the President and the 
General-in-Chief, urging the expedition to East Tennessee as of primary 
importance. I therefore gave my attention to it, intending to start that 
expedition from Somerset, with the troops that were moving against the 
enemy at Mill Spring. The preparation of transportation was urged for- 
ward, and a strong force was set to work to corduroy the road to render it 
practicable. Nevertheless it was bai'ely possible to subsist the ten thou- 
sand men at Somerset. The experiment demonstrated the impracticability 
of sending an expedition to East Tennessee in such force as to insure suc- 
cess in the present condition of the roads; and on the 1st of Fe})ruary I 
80 advised the General-in-Chief in a letter with full explanations, and ex- 
presed my purpose to proceed against Bowling Green. 

I had had no communication with General Halleck since his reply to 
my letter of the Hd of .January, but on the 80th I received a dispatch 
from him, saying, without giving particulars, that W had ordered an ex- 
pedition against Fort Henry. The same day I suggested to him, by let- 



ter, a rapid gunboat expedition up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers 
to destroy bridges over those streams. Although Forts Henry and Don- 
elson had been considerably strengthened, I believed the gunboats could 
pass them without any great risk. On the 6th, I ordered one brigade 
from the mouth of Grreen River, and eight new regiments, to reinforce 
General Halleck's expedition. They did not, however, arrive until after 
the capture of that place, which occurred on the 7th, but took part in 
the subsequent operations against Fort Donelson. 

General Halleck found great difficulty in the movement against Fort 
Donelson, although the distance from Fort Henry was only about twelve 
miles. The enemy had greatly strengthened the works, and increased the 
garrison. Protected as Bowling Green was by fortifications, the formida- 
ble river in front, and by the condition of the roads, I apprehended that 
my operations against that place could not be rapid enough to prevent the 
enemy from reinforcing Fort Donelson so strongly as to endanger the suc- 
cess of General Halleck's operations. Upon consultation with him, there- 
fore, I commenced, on the 13th, the movement of three divisions to rein- 
force him by water, which would not only make the reduction of the place 
certain, but give force enough to operate against Nashville on that line, 
while the rest of my force was threatening Bowling Green in front. The 
advance of General jVIitchel's division arrived opposite Bowling Green on 
the morning of the 14th, and found the bridge in flames and the enemy 
evacuating the place. That officer was directed to cross rapidly and 
throw a force forward towards Nashville ; and the advance on that line 
was strengthened by a division which was to have gone to the Cumber- 
land. 

The operation of passing the river at Bowling Green, in its swollen con- 
dition, was difficult and tedious. The advanced division, General Mitch- 
el's, did not get entirely over for ten days, notwithstanding the energy of 
that offiicer. While this was going on, the troops in rear were employed 
in repairing the railroad. On the 24th, the river was so high that small 
steamers were taken over the broken dams, and reached Bowling Green 
with supplies and to assist in ferrying. About the same time a pontoon 
bridge was laid, and, although the overflow of the banks seriously inter- 
fered, yet the troops were able to pass with comparative rapidity. 

In the meantime I was informed, about the 17th, of the surrender of 
Fort Donelson. I arrived at Bowling Green on the 20th, and on the 21st 
learned that the enemy had evacuated Clarksville and lallen back on Nash- 
ville ; and that he had burned the bridges at Nashville. On the morning 
of the 22d, the troops that had crossed the river at Bowling Green, two 
brigades and a half, started for Nashville without wagons, very few having 
yet been got across. With about 1,000 men on cars, which the enemy 



8 

had not succeeded in carrying oif or destroying, I expected to reach within 
nine miles of Nashville that night; but a heavy rain destroyed the road 
in advance of us, and I did not reach the river opposite Nashville until 
the night of the 24th. The remainder of the troops arrived at the same 
time by marching. I had telegraphed General Halleck, and sent a courier 
through to (Uarksville, giving information of my movements, and request- 
ing that the gunboats should proceed at once up the river. I apprehended 
that they would meet one battery on the way, but they arrived without 
molestation on the night of the 24th, convoying the transports with the 
troops of General Nelson and General Crittenden, three brigades; and, on 
the morning of the 25th, the troops entered Nashville, and took position 
beyond the city, towards Murfreesboro, the enemy having retired to that 
place. 

The river was out of its banks, and the work of crossing was tedious. 
General Mitchel's Division passed over on the 25th and 2Gth, and the 
other Divisions as rapidly as possible, but the whole had not crossed until 
about the 5th of March. General Thomas' Division arrived by water on 
the 2d. The troops moved by forced marches, without baggage, owing to 
the difficulty of getting their wagons over the streams. The trains did not, 
therefore, arrive for several days after. Those that could arrive more 
rapidly that way were transported by water up the Cumberland. 

The strength of the enemy at Murfreesboro, after the evacuation of 
Nashville, was estimated at the time, and has since been stated by persons 
who had means of judging, at about thirty thousand men. This force 
included what was collected of the troops that were defeated at Mill 
Spring, and the force that had been at Bowling Green and other points 
north of the Cumberland Eiver, excepting what was captured at Fort 
Donelsou. It commenced moving South from Murfreesboro in a very few 
days after my arrival at Nashville, and, as is well known, eventually 
formed a junction with the forces of General Beuregard, at Corinth. A 
pursuit with the hope of overtaking it on its line of march, would have 
been futile for that object, even if the force had been up to commence it 
at once ; for every stream was flooded, and every bridge was destroyed as 
the enemy retired. The only alternative was to operate deliberately 
against some line or point which it was his object to defend, and the 
Memphis and Charleston Kailroad presented such an object. It was the 
same for the forces that were operating up the Tennessee River, under the 
orders of Major General Halleck, more particularly against the enemy"s 
forces that by the recent operations had been compelled to evacuate the 
principal part of VV^est Tennessee. It was necessary that our forces should 
act in concert against that object; better still that they should act under 
one direction ; and the order of the War Department, which I received on 



'the 12th of Mavcli, placing the whole force under General Halleck's 
■command, was, therefore, eminently proper. On the 15th I commenced 
the movement tovrard the Tennessee River, in pursuance of the under- 
standing which had voluntarily taken place between us before the orders 
of the War Department were received. General Halleck's dispatch of the 
16th designated Savannah as the point where I was to form a junction 
with the force already assembling on the Tennessee River. 

Before leaving Nashville I sent Brigadier General G. W. Morgan to 
take command of a column I had left on the Cumberland Gap road, which 
was increased to a division by scattered regiments that remained in 
Kentucky. He was instructed to pursue with energy and discretion the 
object of taking Cumberland Gap, and for his further progress to be 
governed by circumstanes in East Tennessee, or to hold the enemy in 
check in that quarter, if his force should prove insufficient to advance. 
The operations of this column have been investigated partially by the 
Commission, and I shall allude to them again in that connection. I also 
moved General Mitchel's Division forward to Fayetteville, twenty-six 
miles from Huntsville, for the purpose of seizing the Memphis and 
Charleston Road. The enemy withdrew his troops from that line, except- 
ing small guards, and General Mitchel on the 12th of April, five days 
after the battle of Shiloh, entered Huntsville. Various other dispositions 
and instructions were made with reference to the troops that were to 
occupy Middle Tennessee during my absence with the main army. The 
latter numbered about thirty-seven thousand men ; the former about 
eighteen thousand. 

The march toward the Tennessee river, on the 15th of March, com- 
menced with one division, preceded by a rapid movement of cavalry, to 
get possession of the bridges as far as Columbia before the enemy could 
destroy them. It succeeded with all of the bridges excepting the one 
over Duck river, at Columbia, and one four miles north of that place. 
The work of preparing the means of crossing Duck river was urged for- 
ward by all possible means, and was under the charge of zealous and 
energetic officers ; but it was not completed until the 31st of March. The 
river, which, at first forty feet deep, had been gradually receding, was 
watched day by day, and finally became fordable for cavalry the very day 
the bridges were completed. The army then moved forward steadily, the 
advance and myself reaching Savannah, about ninety miles from Columbia, 
on the evening of the 5th of April. The other divisions followed, with 
intervals of six miles from the head of one division to the head of the 
next. 

The battle of Shiloh, which occuri:ed on the 6th and 7th of April, has 
been justly considered one of the most remarkable of the war, in regard 
2 



10 

to the numbers engaged, the reverses of the first day and the success of 
the second. The particuhirs. so far as my command was concerned, hare 
been given in my official report of that battle, hereunto appended, and it is 
not necessary to repeat them. I believe that report states, in very mode- 
rate terms, the part which my command toot in the incidents of that field. 
It has been conceded the my army rescued our forces, on the west bank 
of the Tennessee, from certain destruction or capture ; and the movement 
which preceded the battle was prompt and even rapid. I marched from 
Nashville not to rescue those forces, but to form a Junction with them to op- 
erate against the enemy's position at Corinth ; and it was desirable, and 
General Halleck's instructions required me, to eff"eet the junction as 
promptly as possible. I was informed that 1 should find General Grant's 
army at Savannah, on the east side of the river, and I was surprised, and 
even concerned, when I heard, during the march, that it was on the west 
bank ; but I was relieved from anxiety by the information that it was so 
protected by high water in the streams which interposed between it and 
the enemy, and nearly surrounded it, as to be perfectly secure. 

It is not necessary to go into the particulars of the campaign against Co- 
rinth. My command formed the center in the advance on that place, By 
General Halleck's order, one of my divisions — General Thomas' — served 
with General Grant's command in that advance, and did not again come 
under my supervision, or actually under my control, until about the last of 
July. The enemy's works were entered about daylight on the morning of 
the y^th, having been evacuated the previous night. 

1 come now to the period embiaced in the investigations of the Commis- 
sion, and proceed to a general review of the more material facts which have 
been developed in the evidence. 1 shall do this without pretending to ofi'er 
at present a nice analysis of the testimony, or, as a general rule, even citing 
that which bears on the points which I claim to be established by it. No 
other course could well be pursued, because otherwise much time would be 
consumed in illustrating facts to which no importance might attach, as no 
specific charges or aUegations have been submitted for trial. Such an anal- 
ysis could only be made by me after knowing what points the Commission 
may give importance to. That I have no means of knowing now, a vast 
amount of evidence, oral and documentary, having been submitted without 
any explained purpose, and which may be important or not, according to 
the interpretation or bearing given to it. Nor shall I remark upon any of 
the incidents of this investigation. 

The subjects submitted to the Commission by the War Department areas 

follows: 

First. "In reference to General Buell suffering the State of Kentucky lo 
be invaded by the Rebel forces under General Bragg." 



11 

Second. ''In his failing to relieve Munfordville, and suffering it to be cap- 
tared." 

Third. "In reference to the battle of Perryville and Genera] Buell's con- 
duct during that battle, and afterward suffering the Rebel forces to escape 
from Kentucky without loss or capture." 

Fourth. "Such other matters touching the military operations aforesaid, 
as in the judgment of the Commission shall be beneficial to the service." 

On the 30th of May, after the evacuation of Corinth by the rebel forces, 
I received a communication from Major-&eneral Halleck, informing me 
that his first object was to open the lines of railroad centering at that 
point from our rear and flanks, and directing me to put one of my divis- 
ions OR that duty on the Memphis and Charleston road east of Corinth. I 
accordingly detached the division of Greneral Wood on that service. The 
army of General Pope was following up the,, retiring enemy in the direc- 
tion of Baldwin. On the 4th of^^^h 1 received instructions to re-en- 
force General Pope, near Boonville, with two divisions, in anticipation of 
an attack from the enemy, I accompanied those divisions myself. The 
enemy, however, continued his retreat toward Okalona ; and on the 9th I 
received intimation that a part of the force under my command would 
return to Tennessee, and that I could make my arrangements accordingly. 
At my request I was authorized to start the two divisions (iVelson's and 
Crittenden's) that wei"e with uie, in that direction. General McCook's 
division, then at Corinth, was to remain there until relieved by General 
Thomas's division, which had also been sent to re-enforece General Pope. 
General Thomas's division originally formed part of my army, but had 
been detached from my command since the commeacement of the advance 
upon Corinth. I was informed that it would probably rejoin me at a 
future day for the movement toward Tennessee. 

I stopped at General Halleck's headquarters on my return frnm Boon- 
ville, on the 10th, and visited them again on the 11th; and during those 
visits received bis oral instructions with reference to the campaign I was 
to enter upon. Its object was the occupation of East Tennessee and cer- 
tain important points on the railroad through that region of country — 
Chattanooga. Dalton and Knoxville were points which it was considered 
important to occupy. I requested that I might be allowed to choose my 
own iT>ute ; and at that interview (jeneral Halleck assented, though he had 
been in favor of moving directly on Chattanooga through North Alabama; 
but on the 12th I received a dispatch from him, saying that, on further 
reflection, he deemed it best that the route he had suggested should be 
pursued. My own idea had been to strike a little further north, through 
Middle Tennessee and McMinnville. 

General Halleck desired that the movement should be made as promptly 
as possible, but it was a condition that the railroad from Corinth east should 



12 

be repaired, and it was his idea that I should draw my stipplies by thai 
route. I did not concur in his views in regard to the advantages of thab 
route, and I iraraediately gave orders for repairing" the roads from Nashville 
through Tennessee, and for procuring supplies ir> that way; but I placed 
the superintendence of the Memphis and Charleston Road under an ener- 
getic and experienced engineer, Brigadier- General Smith, put troops on the 
route, and gave orders for pushing the repairs as rapidly as possible. Sub- 
sequently I Tsuggested the inexpediency of repairing the road. It was for 
eighty miles parallel with the enemy's front, and peculiarly exposed to 
attack. This objection was realized in the end, and, in addition, it was 
found impossible to get stock enough on the road to make it of materia^ 
use, even while it was kept open; so that substantially we derived no advan- 
tage from it. It, however, occupied the troops until about the last of June 
in opening it, and detained General Thomas' Division a month longer in 
guarding it; so that that division did not reach Athens and Huntsville until 
the last of July. 

As soon as my destination was pointed out to me, instructions were 
given to my engineer officer, Captain Morton, to prepare the means of 
crossing the river at Florence, and similar instructions were given to Gen- 
eral Mitchel, then commanding at Huntsville, for crossing a portion; of 
my force at Decatur, so as to have the advantage of two roads and two 
crossings. A very efficient ferry was prepared at Florence, and and a 
very inefficient one at Decatur. 

General McCook's division marched from Corinth on the 11th, and 
reached Florence on the loth of June. It was followed closely by Crit- 
tenden's division, which had come into the road at luka from Boonville, 
General Wood's was advanced to and beyond Tuscumbia to repair and 
guard the road, while General Nelson's took its place between luka and 
Tuscumbia. The few boats- that were of light enoxigh draft were employed 
in forwarding supplies by water to Florence; and in ordei" to make up for 
the deficiency, wagon trains were put on the road from Eastport to luka 
to connect with the single half-servieable locomotive and the few cars that 
were available on the railroad. The boats were only able to carry from 
thirty to forty tons over the shoals, and after a few trips could not run at 
all ; after which wagon trains were started on the north side of the river 
between Florence and Waterloo, nearly opposite Eastport. The ferry at 
Florence was ready for use on the 22d of June, and the crossing 
was commenced, but rumors of a movement of the enemy toward luka 
suspended the forward movement from the opposite side until the 25th.. 
Wagon trains were first put across and dispatched to Reynold's Station, 
where they connected with the railroad trains from Nashville, to convey 
supplies over the gap in the road to Athens. General Mitchel had pre- 



13 

vioiisly been instructed to have supplies for a certain number of days, 
until the trains should be established, to meet the troops on their arrival 
at Athens and Decatur. The divisions moved forward in close succession 
by marches of about fourteen miles a day — Nelson's and Wood's, as soon 
as they were relieved from the road by other ti-oops. Wood's Division 
finished crossing at Decatur on the 6th of July. The other three divis- 
ions, crossing at Florence, commenced arriving at Athens on the 27th of 
June. The troops halted at these points momentarily, and their trains 
were thrown into the gap on the railroad to push forward supplies. 

The problem of advancing into East Tennessee was now fairly before 
me. The force which I brought along numbered between twenty-four 
and twenty-five thousand eifective men ; and there w^ere besides about 
sixteen thousand more scattered through Middle Tennessee and North AL 
abama, that I had left behind for service in that region when I marched 
to form the junction with General Grant's army on the Mississippi river in 
April. That force, mainly under the command of General Mitchel, has 
been generally awarded praise for the service it performed, and very 
justly, yet not more than two thousand men ever appeared on the field of 
its operations to oppose it. It was not the numbers of the enemy that 
made its service difficult and creditable, but it was the large extent of 
country it occupied, the length of the lines it had to guard, and the diffi- 
culty of supplying it. Those lines had still to be held in a further ad- 
vance, and with no less force to make them secure, for the force which 
endangered them had been largely increased by the transfer of a large 
part of the enemy's cavalry to the north side of the Tennessee river after 
the evacuation of Corinth, and by the organization of an additional force 
of guerrillas throughout Middle Tennessee and North Alabama, and in 
the south-western portion of Kentucky. 

The limited force available for a further advance into the enemy's 
country, was not, however, at the time of my arrival, the difficulty ; for 
undoubtedly, it was superior to the force which the enemy at that moment 
had in East Tennessee. Experience has shown what might have been 
deduced from reason, that if the movement could have been made without 
serious resistance, while the enemy was yet inferior in force, it could 
have had no permanent result with no more troops than I had. The 
advance of sixty thousand veteran rebel troops through a friendly 
population into Kentucky, where they undoubtedly met many friends, 
has been considered bold, and must have proved fatally disastrous to 
them but for their precipitate retreat. I knoAV no reason why twenty - 
five or thirty thousand men should be sufficient to advance with any 
greater prospect of a permanent advantage, into an exhausted and 
comparatively barren country, and in as close proximity to the whole 



14 

power of the enemy. It was my error to believe at that time that the 
thing was practicable, and I did not represent it otherwise when I was 
assigned to the execution of it ; but I must say also, in extenuation, that I 
did not anticipate that the enemy was to be left so unemployed at other 
points, that he could devote his greatest effort against my enterprise. 
Besides, I regarded it as in the highest degree important, and I supposed 
that no larger force could be spared for it. 

However, at the time of my arrival with my army in North Alabama, 
the immediate obstacle to the execution of the first step, the capture 
of Chattanooga, was that of supplies and the means of crossing the 
Tennessee River. The means to overcome these difficulties had to be 
created, for they did not exist. The lumber had to be sawed and a 
bridge built, and supplies for the troops had to be brought, for the 
country was destitute of them. The country between Decatur and 
Iluntsville, and extending up into Middle Tennessee, is a cultivated 
and productive one ; but as far north as the Tennessee line, and 
even including the southern tier of the counties of Tennessee, it is 
cultivated mainly in cotton. The planters never produce more than an 
ample supply of meat and corn for their own use, and not always that^ 
Further north, Tennessee produces considerable quantities of surpkis 
provisions, but not onovigh to supply the demand further South, as is 
shown by the fact that large quantities of produce from the North- 
western States have annually fotmd a market at Nashville. The demand 
upon the surplus provisions of Tennessee had been increased by the 
rebellion, which cut off the supply from the north-west, and by the armies, 
rebel and Union, which during the Winter and Spring of 18(j2, fed upon 
the country to a considerable extent. North Alabama particularly was left 
in a condition to need the necessaries of life, instead of affording sub- 
sistence for an army. East of Huntsville the spurs of the Cumberland 
Mountain run down nearly to the river, leaving only here and there a 
narrow valley or cove of arrible land. The whole country is rough and 
almost barren, prodiicing no more than is necessary for the support of a 
poor and sparse population. East of Stevenson, as far as Chattanooga, it 
may be said to be destitute both of population and supplies. Beyond 
Chattanooga the productive region of East Tennessee commences ; but 
during last Summer, it was exhausted of supplies, and the people them- 
selves were, as they are now, notwithstanding the new crop they have 
since gathered, suffering for food. These fticts go to the extent of 
rendering it impossible for my army to have advanced and depend 
on the resources of the country. The alternative of drawing its sup- 
plies from its principal base, the Ohio River, was imperative, and my 
wagon transportation was not sufficient to cover breaks in the railroads 
north of Huntsville, and to advance beyond Bridgeport at the same time. 



15 

The first essential, therefore, was the opening of the railroads from 
Nashville; and to that end the force which General Mitchell had been or- 
dered to put at that work was increased by engineer and other troops to 
the whole force that could be employed. Hired mechanics, under the 
military superintendent of railroads, an able and efficient man at such 
work, were also employed; and orders were given to push forward the 
repairs with all possible dispatch. But the work was much more formid- 
able than had been supposed, and the work which I had expected to see 
completed in ten or fifteen days, was not finished vintil the 31st of July, 
on the Nashville and Decatur road. The Nashville and Chattanoog-a road 
was completed on the 12th of July ; the trains started through on the 
13th, and were stopped by the attack and surrender at Murfreesboro, by 
which, and by subsequent successful attacks, the completion of that road 
was delayed until the 28th of July. 

In order to conceal the object, or at least the progress, of my campaign 
as much as possible, it was desirable not to concentrate ?apy force at a point 
which immediately threatened the enemy's position until I was prepared to 
move against him. This was also expedient from the necessity of 
placing the troops in positions where they could be most conveniently 
subsisted, and where they could give the necessary assistance in repairing 
the roads, and in guarding them until they should be securely established, 
and protected at the more vulnerable points by stockades or other 
defenses which would enable a small force to maintain itself against 
a larger one. Prior to my arrival in North Alabama, however, Gen- 
eral Mitchel had entertained serious apprehensions of an attack on 
the positions which he occupied in that region, particularly at Battle 
Creek and along the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; and repeated 
dispatches from him urged the pressing importance of reinforcements 
to guard against the supposed danger. These reports of a probable 
attack at Battle Creek were repeated just after my arrival, and rendered it 
proper to increase the force at that point. McCook's and Crittenden's 
divisions were accordingly ordered there. They marched from Athens 
about the 4th, and arrived at Battle Creek about the 14th of July. One 
brigade from the former was put at work on the road from Stevenson to 
Dec-hard. Nelson's division still remained at Athens, fui-nishins- a strono- 
working party on that road. Wood's division was stopped near Decatur, 
where it protected the ferry and the small garrison on the opposite side of 
the river; the idea not having been yet abandoned of making the Memphis 
and Chattanooga road west of that point available for supplying my troops 
and communicating with the forces about Corinth. With these disposi- 
tions, orders were given for establishing the regular road guards, and for 
getting together again the fragments of brigades and regiments previously 



16 

there, which were found scattered in very great confusion ; a brigade was 
organized to move from Murfreesboro and Tullahoma and occupy McMinn- 
ville; intelligent and energetic officers were put in charge of the road 
guards and road repairs; mills were set to work to get out lumber for a 
ponton bridge; horses were ordered for the cavalry, which had been left 
in Middle Tennessee, and was in bad condition; and various other jjrepa- 
rations ordered to enable the troops to move promptly and eflfectively as 
soon as the roads were completed so that supplies could be provided. 

The first raid of Morgan into Kentucky took place early in July. He 
threatened Bowling Green and Munfordsville about the 8th of July; defeated 
three companies of cavalry at Burksville about the same time, and then went 
to Lebanon, where he destroyed the depot and hospital buildings. Thence 
he proceeded north through Lexington, as far as Paris. He was engaged 
at Paris and other points during his expedition, but with no important 
result, tie finally recrossed the Cumberland River at or near Mill Spring, 
about the 23d of July, and made his way to Knoxville. 

The force which made this incursion has been said not to have exceeded 
one thousand men, though at the time it was estimated as high as twenty- 
five hundred or three thousand. It produced a good deal of alarm in the 
state, and many apprehended that the force would receive large accessions 
to its ranks, and that the sympathizing part of the population would be- 
come troublesome; but those apprehensions were not realized. The injury 
was confined mainly to the inconvenience and suffering inflicted on individ- 
uals, and I have no doubt that the effect on the population was to strengthen 
its adhesion to tLe Union. 

A good deal of censure was cast on the troops and the military officers 
in the state, that Morgan should have escaped without capture or greater 
loss, but not with much justice, when the circumstances are considered. 
The objects to be aimed at by my army, after the occupation of Nashville 
in February, made it necessary to carry forward, for further operations, 
nearly the whole of the force at my disposal ; and, indeed, the high stage 
of water in the Cumberland river afforded security at that time against 
such invasions, even if the rebel force had not left that region of country 
to concentrate for the struggle on the south side of the Tennessee. For 
these reasons, except the column which was operating against Cumberland 
(^ap, not more than about four thousand troops, mostly infantry, were 
left behind, and these were scattered over the principal part of the state, 
more as a police force and to guard railroads, than to prevent invasion. 

The probable result of our operations against Corinth developed to my 
mind the advantage the enemy could derive from the employment of a 
large cavalry force in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and on the 12th 
of May I advised the Secretary of War of the necessity of having at least 



17 

five move cavalry regiments in those two states. 1 was answered that 
there was not at the. time any eavah-y to spare for that service, but that an 
additional force was to be raised, and that a part of it would be sent to 
me. None came, though authority was given to the officer commanding 
in Kentucky to raise some cavalry regiments. These, however, were in no 
condition to render much service at the time of Morgan's first raid. Sub- 
sequent events have shown what might have been evident enough without 
the experiment, that, to prevent such incursions and carry on the opera- 
tions in front which the progress of our arms had rendered necessary, was 
physically impossible with the force that was available. I had a front 
extending from Corinth to Cumberland Gap, through a hostile population, 
a distance of three hundred miles ; in fact, it extended to Piketon, in the 
north-east corner of Kentucky, one hundred miles further, with lines of 
communicatinn varying from two hundred to three hundred miles in depth. 
To press successfully against the rebel armies along the line of the Mem- 
phis and Charleston railroad, it had been necessary to denude the lines and 
the whole country in my rear almost entirely of troops. The front, from 
Battle Creek to Cumberland Gap, it was not possible to occupy at all. Is it 
astonishing that one thousand cavalry, familiar with every path, should be 
able to penetrate this vast extent of country, and escape without capture ? 
Morgan had nut yet disappeared from Kentucky, after his first inroad, 
when Forrest with a large force suddenly appeared at Murfreesboro', on the 
13th of July, surprised and captured the garrison, consisting of some 
fourteen hundred men — cavalry, ariillery and infantry — forming part of the 
force which was about to march from that place and Tullahoma to occupy 
McMinnville, and did serious damage to the railroad. Two other regiments 
which had been designed as a permanent garrison for Murfreesboro' had 
been detached and sent into Kentucky on the occasion of Morgan's incur- 
sion. The consequence of this disaster was serious. The use of the rail- 
road from Nashville, which had been completed the very day before, and 
which I was depending on to throw supplies into Stevenson for a forward 
movement, was set back two weeks; the torce of Forrest threatened Nash- 
ville ilself and the whole line of railroad through Tennessee; and the occu- 
pation of McMinnville was delayed two weeks. It became necessary to 
move northward some of the troops in North Alabama, to drive out the 
rebel force, and guard against further embarrassment. Nelson's Division 
was ordered by rapid marches to Murfreesboro', one brigade going by rail- 
road throup-h Nashville; two brio-adesof Wood's Division were ordered from 
Decatur to Shelbyville by forced marches, and subsequently to Dechard, to 
give greater security to Elk River Bridge, and guard the important loute 
from the mountains into North Alabama through Winchester. A little later 
the remaining brigade of Wood's Division was ordered to Stevenson to erect 
3 



18 

defensive works for the depot which was to be established at that point for 
the movement against Chattanooga. The excitement caused by Morgan's 
raid into Kentucky had been so great, and the call for troops so urgent, that 
I apprehended I should be compelled to send a division there; but to do 
that was to put an advance into East Tennessee out of the question, and I 
determined to trust Kentucky to the few troops already there, rather than 
abandon the object for which I had started. 

The movement of General Nelson toward Nashville was delayed some- 
what by injury to the Duck River Bridge by high water. He arrived at 
Murfreesboro' on the 18lh. The enemy left as he advanced, threw himself 
on the road between that place and Nashville, and captured a guard of 
about eighty men and destroyed two more bridges. The efforts of General 
Nelson to intercept him were unsuccessful. After throwing up some field 
works for a small force at Murfreesboro', to protect the depot which it was 
necessary to establish there, General Nelson started, on the 2d of August, 
with two brigades and arrived at McMinnville on the 3d of August. One 
brigade remained at Murfreesboro', but on the arrival of the force which 
had been designated to occupy the place, that brigade joined him at Mc- 
Minnville. 

The railroad from Nashville to Stevenson was completed on the 28th of 
July; that from Nashville to Decatur on the 31st, and preparations com- 
menced for an advance. Supplies were pushed forward to the depot at 
Stevenson, the ponton bridge was gotten ready to be laid, the wagon 
trains which had been in use on the Decatur road were thrown across to 
Dechard, from which point they could be moved rapidly to Stevenson ; 
and the troops, including (jrcneral Thomas' division, which arrived at 
Athens and Huntsville about the 31st of July, were moved so as to be in 
convenient positions for the same object. In the mean time the enemy 
continued his operations with large bodies of cavalry against our long 
lines of communication through Tennessee and Kentucky, seconded in 
Tennessee by the organization of guerrilla bands which swarmed in every 
part of the country. These latter were frequently encountered and de- 
feated by detachments of our small cavalry force ; but the former, moving 
in superior force, and striking at vulnerable points, were generally suc- 
cessful, and finally, on the lOth of August, severed effectually our com- 
munications between Nashville and Louisville. In addition to the 
destruction of our lines of communication, the efi'ect of these operations, 
and of the formidable preparations which were reported and believed to be 
in progress for the invasion of Middle Tennessee and the capture of Nash- 
ville, was to intimidate our friends and embolden our enemies among the 
people, who not only would not bring in supplies voluntarily, but used 
every means to prevent us from finding them; so that nothing could be 



19 

obtained from the country except by means of our own trains under the 
pi'otection of strong escortSv On the 6th of August I gave orders for for- 
tifying Nashville, to make it secure with a small garrison against any 
attack from cavalry. 

On the 10th of August Morgan again made his appearance at Gallatin, 
surprised and captured the garrison, amounting to one hundred and fifty 
infantry; then moved toward Nashville, destroying several bridges and 
capturing the guards ; then toward Bowling Green, destroying the tunnel 
seven miles north of Gallatin, and several ti*essel works and small bridges 
in that i-egion. He was, however, handsomely repulsed in some instances 
by the small force opposed to him in these attacksv Simultaneously with 
this, Forrest, with a large force, moved toward the Cumberland river to be 
in a position to support Morgan, or threaten Nashville, if it should dimin- 
ish its garrison, which consisted of about two thousand men. Immediately 
after the occurrence of the first raid, I determined to withdraw my cavalry as 
mvich as possible from its service in detachments against the bands of guerril- 
las which infested the roads, and concentrate it in large bodies. By support- 
ing them with infantry, equip]>ed to move lightly, I hoped to be able to drive 
the enemy's heavy cavah-y force from the lines. One of these commands 
I designed should operate from Murfreesboro, and another from McMinn- 
ville. An experienced cavalry 0i6&cer was assigned to the command of the 
former, with general instructions which allowed him a good deal of dis- 
cretion. The zeal of this officer caused him to move in pvii-suit of the 
enemy with about seven hundred men, before the whole of his command 
had ioined. On hearinti' of this, and knowino; that he was outnumbered 
by the enemy, I dispatched instriictions for reinforcing him with inftmtry 
from McMinnville, if he could be reached, and to «**et*Hi him until he had 
sufficient strength. The instructions did not, however, reach him, nor 
could his whereabouts be ascertained so as to reinforce him. Hearing 
that Morgan had again appeared in the neighborhood of Gallatin, he 
crossed the river at Hartsville in pursuit, engaged Morgan's force not far 
from that place about the middle of August, was defeated, and himself 
and sojue one hundred and fifty of his men taken prisoners. The remain- 
der made their escape, in stragglers and small bodies, to Nashville, The 
strength of Morgan's band at this time was estimated at from fifteen hun- 
dred to three thousand. 

Work was immediately commenced to repair again the road north of 
Nashville, but the continiied presence of Morgan's force in that quarter 
made it impossible to carry it beyond Gallatin, except by withdrawing 
from the front so large a force as to preclude the idea of an advance; and 
I, therefore, determined to defer it until it could be protected by a force 
which I hoped might come from Louisville, of the new troops that were 



20 

being called out. On tte IGth of August I ordered Major -General Nelson 
to Kentucky to command, and sent with him three General and some other 
oificers of experience, and two batteries of artillery. The position re- 
quired an officer of his rank, and I had great confidence in his energy and 
ability. 

While the enemy was producing this serious embarrassment by the 
operations of his large cavalry force, regular and irregular, on our long 
lines of communication, he was collecting a large army at various points 
in Tennessee, from Chattanooga eastward. For a considerable time the 
main point of concentration wbs doubtful, and the railroad facilities which 
the enemy possessed enabled him to concentrate speedily at any point. 
General Bragg arrived in person at Chattanooga on the 28th of July, by 
which time his whole force was within easy reach of that point; and 
from that time reports were current of his intention to assume the offensive. 
Sometimes they were quite positive that he was already crossing the river 
at Chattanooga, Kingston and other points. 

The lowest estimate that could be made of the force with which the 
enemy was prepared to advance, according to the best sources of informa- 
tion, was sixty thousand men. That has, I think, been more than con- 
firmed by the evidence before the Commission. Eye-witnesses estimated 
the force as high as one hundred thousand. My dispatch of the 7th of 
August to the General-in-Chief, Major-General Halleck, gave information 
on this subject somewhat in detail, and not in a discouraging tone; for I 
was continuing my preparation to advance, and was. In my own mind, dis- 
posed to make perhaps more than due allowance for exaggeration in the 
information that reached me. I was the more confident, when, on the 10th 
of August, General Halleck authorized me to call on General Grant for 
two divisions, if I should find it absolutely necessary. On the 12th, I re- 
quested General Grant to send the divisions, intending to use one of them 
to protect my communications with Louisville, and bring the other to the 
front; but their movements were at first Involved In some uncertainty. At 
a later period I could get no information of them at all, and feared that 
General Grant had not been able to spare them, as he was himself 
threatened. One of them reached Murfreesboro on the 1st, and the other 
Nashville about the 12th of September. 

Very soon the Information of the enemy's intention took such shape as 
to leave no doubt that he was about to invade Middle Tennessee with a 
superior force, and to make it proper to suspend the accumulation of sup- 
plies at Stevenson, and establish a depot at Decherd, as being most suit- 
able for that disposition of my troops which the designs of the enemy, 
. as far as they could be divined, rendered proper to oppose him. The 
information pointed to Nashville as his principal aim, and justified the 



21 

conclusion that at least he believed he had force enough to accomplish his 
object. It was ascertained that the number of my troops was quite 
accurately known to him. The route which he would take was altogether 
a matter of conjecture, to be founded on probabilities. McMinnville was 
mentioned very often, in the information which reached me, as the first 
point of attack, and they were so frequent that I deemed it proper to 
strengthen the force in that quarter ; but the difficulty of crossing the 
mountain weakened the probability of an advance in that direction, while 
an advance into North Alabama was not only spoken of in connection with 
the enemy's plans, but ofi'ered many advantages. By crossing Waldron's 
Ridge into the Sequatchy Valley, he had a good, level road down that 
valley to Battle Creek, which was an indefensible position for us while he 
occupied the opposite side of the Tennessee river with his artillery. This 
would keep him in constant communication with his supplies at Chatta- 
nooga, by means of the railroad on the opposite bank and the steamers 
which he had ; his large cavalry force operating against Nashville, and on 
my lines of cummunication, would compel me to employ at least twenty 
thousand men to protect them even that far, leaving about twenty-five 
thousand men to oppose his advance in front. If the column from Kings- 
ton should advance on Nashville, I should be compelled to fall back in 
the face of even an inferior force, for the protection of that place ; and thus 
both Alabama and the principal part of Middle Tennessee could be 
reclaimed by the enemy without necessarily risking a battle. It is not too 
much to say that fifty thousand men thus employed on this theater of 
of operations, with the superior cavalry force which the enemy had, would 
be an over-match for sixty thousand operating upon lines of such depth, 
in the midst of an unfriendly population. 

Such were the inducements which an advance upon Battle Creek ofi'ered 
to the enemy, even supposing that I was entirely on the north side of the 
Cumberland ridge, say at Decherd ; but, in fact, he was well aware that I 
still occupied North Alabama, with some twelve thousand men at Battle 
Creek, while the rest of my force extended as far noi-th and east as 
McMinnville. If he could reach Battle Creek beforce the force at that 
place should extricate itself by moving to the east, it would have to go 
around by the way of Huntsville, and thus make a march of one hundred 
and twenty miles to reach Decherd, the nearest point at which it could 
possibly form a junction with the forces north of the mountain, while he, 
by a march of twenty-five miles from Jasper, could reach the same point, 
and thus throw his whole force between my scattered troops. The 
position at Battle Creek is, for a force whose communications are on the 
north side of the mountain, one of the worst that can be imagined against 
an enemy coming from the Sequatchy Valley and holding the opposite 



99 

bank of the Tennessee River. A spur of the Cumberland ridge comes to 
within two hundred yards of the river ; Battle Creek runs at the foot of 
this spur, on the east side, emptying into the river near the point ; the 
only position for troops is west of the spur ; the road to Dechard, a 
distance of twenty-five miles, passes around the point of this spur and 
along its side up Battle Creek, in full view from the opposite side of the 
river and the creek ; and there is no other road to the north side of the 
mountain practicable for loaded wagons short of Huntsville, distant 
seventy-five miles. For the double purpose of guarding against an attack 
in this faulty position, and of observing the movements and checking the 
advance of the enemy in the Sequatchy Valley,. I issued the instructions 
of the 19th of August, to Major General MeCook ; my purpose then being 
to attack the enemy in the Sequatchy Valley if possible, or to give him 
battle at the first point on his route where I could concentrate my troops. 
Those orders required General McCook, upon the first intelligence of an 
advance of the enemy toword the Seqiiatchy Valley, to move promptly 
up the valley to the Anderson and Tbermaii road, with the two brigades 
of his division which were with him, to check the progress of the enemy 
and observe his movements. If pressed he was to fall back on the 
Therman road deliberately, until he should form a junction with the main 
force coming from the side of McMinnville. The other division which 
was with him at Battle Creek, General Crittenden's, was also to move up the 
valley to the Tracy City and Altamont roadlj which enters the valley ten 
miles below the Therman road. He was to support General McCook in the 
valley, watching the old Nashville and Chattanooga stage road, which enters 
it from the Tennessee River at the point designated, and under like circum- 
stances, he was to fall back for a similar purpose on the Iligginbottom 
road toward Tracy City and Altamont, where ih^ junction would be 
formed. On the 2()th I learned that the eneiuy was certainly crossing at 
Chattanooga and other points, and I immediately directed General McCook 
to execute the orders already described. On the same day I left Hunts- 
ville, visited the posts at Stevenson and Battle Creek, and the following 
day went to Dccherd to direct the movements for the proposed junction. 
I deemed it of the highest importance, for political as well as 
military reasons, to maintain my position in North Alabama if possible, 
in connection with those movements ; for which the instructions of the 
19th of August, given to General Rousseau, the officer in command in 
North Alabama, in anticipation of my advance upon Chattanooga, were 
equally applicable ; but I reduced the force in that (juartcr somcAvhat, 
leaving a regiment in fortifications at Battle Creek, one at Stevenson, and 
two at Huntsville ; besides the road guards and the force on the Nashville 
and Decatur line. The orders for the concentration at Altamont — see the 



23 

instructions of the 23d of August to General Thomas — had reference to 
the phin of operations above referred to, for opposing the movements of 
the enemy, except that the information rendered it apparently certain 
that the enemy would certainly advance on the Therman road, and that 
Altamont was the point farthest to the front at which he could be met. 
On the first supposition I had expected to intercept him in the Sequatchy 
Valley. 

In moving up the valley on the 20th, General McCook received infor- 
mation from his spies and scouts which made him believe that the enemy 
would be in the Sequatchy valley, and therefore in a position to intercept 
him, before he could march to the Therman road ; and he therefore re- 
turned down the valley to the Higginbottom road. That road was found 
to be impracticable for his artillery, and he moved still nearer to Battle 
Creek, and put himself on the road which follows up Battle Creek and then 
crosses the mountain. I there sent him orders, on the 23d, to move to 
Pelham for the purpose of effecting the concentration at Altamont. The 
difficulties of the route prevented the concentration at the time appointed 
and in the mean time information in regard to the movements of the en- 
emy made it a matter of very great doubt whether it could be effected at 
that point at all before the enemy would anticipate it. The only alterna- 
tive seemed to be to concentrate there or at Murfreesboro. I determined 
to attempt the former, and gave the orders accordingly. Those orders an- 
ticipated that from the greater difficulties General McCook had to over- 
come, the troops moving from McMinnville, under Major General Thomas, 
would reach Altamont first. The latter was instructed to attack the en- 
emy's advance, if it should have reached there, and hold his position, if 
possible, until the other troops came up ; and in the event of being unable 
to do that, the various columns were instructed as to the roads by which 
they should fall back to form a junction in rear. General Thomas marched 
to Altamont with a portion of his force at the time appointed. He found 
no enemy, and believing that he could not remain there for want of water, 
returned immediately to McMinnville. On his report, and in consequence 
of his action, I stopped the movement of all except General McCook's 
division, which remained at Altamont in observation until the final concen- 
tration at Murfreesboro. 

The information which I received still pointed clearly to the Thurman 
road as the one by which the enemy would advance, if at all ; it is the 
best road across the mountain, and has the advantage of branching at Al- 
tamont into no less than four roads, which descend the mountain to an arc 
forty miles long, from McMinnville on one flank to Deekerd on the other. 
Still, the movements of the enemy were less rapid than was expected, and 
placed him in a position to use that road or those further east. Many 



24 

officers doubted that he meant to cross out of the Sequatchy valley at all, 
but supposed that his movements were only intended as demonstrations to 
cover the advance of his columns into Kentucky from Knoxville. In 
the meantime our supplies were diminishing rapidly, with no prospect of 
renewal until a sufficeint force was detached to restore our broken commu- 
nications. This pressing necessity left no time either to advance, or to 
await the arrival of an enemy who could choose his time and route, with 
the certainty that the necessity of subsistence would very soon compel me 
to fall back, in whole or in part, whether there was an enemy in front or 
not, as long as his cavalry continued its operations in rear. The news 
from Kentucky was unsatisfactory. The rebel force under Kirby Smith 
was coming into the State, there was nothing but new levies to oppose 
him, and it was not known what number of them had been collected. So 
far from being able to open the communication between Nashville and 
Louisville, and from Cumberland Gap to Lexington, it was not improbable 
that those places themselves might soon be seized by the rebel forces. 
Under these circumstances, I determined to concentrate my army at Mur- 
freesboro, and set to work to open the railroad north of Nashville. That 
object had already been delayed too long upon the hope of having it done 
by a force from Louisville. Orders were accordingly given on the 30th of 
August to the various commands and guards, distributed over an area of 
about one hundred and fifty by one hundred miles of territory and some 
three hundred miles of railroad, so as to concentrate on the 5th of Sep- 
tember. The routes and marches were prescribed, and the movement was 
executed simultaneously and with perfect precision. With the exception 
of the force on the Decatur road, which was ordered to Nashville, the 
whole army, coming from various quarters and different distances, on four 
roads, concentrated at Murfreesboro on the 5th of September, bringing 
with it whatever supplies could be collected from the country. A small 
remnant of provisions, for which there was insufficient transportation, was 
destroyed at Huntsville, and, with that exception, not a pound of supplies 
was lost by the movement. After it was ordered, I learned that a consid- 
erable quantity of cotton, belonging to persons who had purchased it in 
the country, was at Athens, awaiting transportation. In order to give 
them an opportunity to remove it, I delayed the evacuation of that place 
perhaps a day or so. 

On the 1st of September I learned that a large rebel force, under Gen- 
eral Kirby Smith, had actually appeared in Central Kentucky, having 
defeated and routed the force under General Nelson at Ilichmond. This 
effijctually cut off the division at Cumberland Gap from its base. I was 
anxious to rescue that force, and the shortest route by which it could be 
done was to direct a column from McMinnville, by the way of Somerset, 



25 

apoij the rear of Kirby Smith's army. I supposed tliat that might be 
done and still keep a front about McMinnville toward the army of (leneral 
Bragg in the Sequatch}^ valley; while the two divisions, one of which had 
arrived that day, from Corinth should open the coiumiinications between 
Nashville and Louisville. The forces at McMinnville and in that vicinity 
had not yet withdrawn from their position, and I accordingly' suspended 
their movement, leaving its execution, however, to (xeneral Thomas, who 
was at Mc3Iinnville, and had the best oiiportunity to know any movements 
of the enemy in the Sequatchj valley that Avould affect it. He answered, 
stating the advantages of a concentration at Murfreesboro, and advising 
me that he would march the following day, and so the concentration was 
executed as originally ordered. 

I proceed now to notice certain theories and opinions tliat have been 
advanced, concerning a plan of operations to oppose th-e movement of the 
rebel army across the mountain. As evidence they are of no more value 
than though they had been expressed in idle discussimi around a camp 
lire, and are only entitled to credit according as they are correct in their 
premises and rational in their conclusions. They were new to me until 
this investigation had made some progress, and it appears that one of them 
in particular, was promulgated after the arrival of my army in Louisville, 
where it was used as a text for criticism by officers who have not appeared 
as friendly witnesses before this Commission. 

Neither my own feelings, nor any tact that I am aware of would 
jiistify me in assuming that General Thomas has entertained any 
other thaJi the most friendly disposition towards me; but I was 
.surprised at tbe opinion expressed by him before the Commission, 
that Bragg's army might have been attacked at Sparta ; and more 
astonished at the statement that he had urged upon me to concen- 
trate at that place. My inquiries elicited the information that this 
proposition was communicated to me by telegraph on the 28th of August. 
At m^' request the dispatcdi was subsequently presented. It proved to 
have been written on the 22d instead of the 28th. It will be 
better understood after a brief review of the circumstances that gave rise 
to it. 

(leneral Thomas took command at McMinnville on the 19th of August. 
About that time I received very positive intelligence that the rebel forces 
were crossing the Tennessee River at three points at least : about ten thou- 
sand at Kingston, at least ten thousand at Harrison, and a force variously 
estimated at from forty to sixty thousand at Chattanooga. I telegraphed 
General Thomas and other officers on the 19th and 20th, in regard to this 
information, and prepared them for the further movements the enemy 
might be expected to make. I told him to look to Sparta and Smithviile, 
4 



26 

anticipating that tlie colnmn from Kingston might adrance on that ronte 
against McMinnville, while we were threatened by the larger force else- 
where, or else towards Nashville to threaten our commnnications. This col- 
umn he evidently kept in his mind, and it seemed to me that it was the onlj- 
one he seriously regarded. The Chattanooga force proper, as he called it, 
he appeared either to doubt the existence of, or, at least, its purpose to 
cros,s the mountain. On the contrary I had reasons which he probably 
did not knoWy to believe that it would advance by the Therman road. I, 
therefore telegraphed General Thomas on the 22d of August, as follows: 

" From McCook's information this morning, it seems almost certain that 
Bragg is marching nn McMinnville. His advance was at the top of Wal- 
dron's ridge last night. McCown is said to be crossing at Kingston, and 
Withers at Harrison. Of course they will ex])ect to unite. What sort of 
ground can we take by concentrating at 3IcMinnville? How would it do 
at Altamont? Is the ground such as to give us the advantage of our 
artillery? How many days rations have you? Are you provided with 
Ammunition? Be ready to march in the morning. Answer immediately." 

And again as follows: 

"Of course y(»u will instantly recall your absent troops. I will proba- 
bly bring the Second Kentucky by rail to march from here. We will 
advance to attack in the Sequatchy valley. I can hardly think the enemy 
will attempt the march across to McMinnvilla — at least not immediately. 
It appears to me that he will rather endeavor to get into North Alabama, 
and perhaps strike across to Decherd. If we advance to Altamont we 
may thwart him in both, and preserve our communications with Decherd 
and Nashville. If we concentrate at McMinnville we lose North Alabama 
and Decherd? What think you? The great difficulty is in moving in the 
mountains with our trains. Of course we must cut loose from everything 
but our ammunition trains and subsistence for about six days, most of it 
in haversacks." 

His answer to the first is the dispatch dated the 22d at McMinnville, 
referred to in his testimony, and is in these words : 

"By all means concentrate here. The enemy can not reach Nashville 
by any other route across the mountains, unless by Sparta. At Altamont 
I am positively informed the enemy would have an equal advantage with 
ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage; and by being 
here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at 
Allen's ford across Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or 
Sparta to reach Nashville. I have six day's rations and plenty of ammu- 
tion. Did you get my dispatch of to-day? I can not think that Bragg 
is coming here either by the Hill or Thurman road. My reconnoitering 
party went into Dunlap yesterday." 

His answer, of the same date, to the second, is as follows: 

"We can get neither forage nor water at Altamont. It will be as diffi- 
cult for us to march across the mountains as the enemy to come either to 
Altamont or this place. I would not advise concentrating here, except for 
battle, or for an advance into Fast Tennessee. I think our communica- 
tions with Nashville will be better prCvserved by holding Decherd with a 



27 

td'ivisioti to enable tis to corie<?ntrate either there, if threatened, or at this 
phice. I have also informatiou that Tupello has been abandoned, and the 
most of the enemy at that pUace have been sent to Chattanooga. T there- 
fore do not apprehend an attempt to regain North Alabama." 

Upon further information that the enemy was advancing rapidly on the 
Thruman road, I answered him, 05i the 2yd, as follows; 

"There is no possibility of our concentrating at McMinnville. We 
must conc^-utrate hi advance, aad avSsume the offensive, or fall back at 
last to Murfmesboro. I d-eem the former the wisest, and we will act ac- 
•cordingly. I wish you therefore to move by a forced niarch to Altamout, 
thei-e to form a junction with McCook, Crittenden and Sehoej^f. .McCook 
and Crittenden started for Tracy City from Jasper Yesterday. I presume 
they ai-e now at Tracy City, though possibly not. Schoepf will march at 
once. The junction must be formed to-morrow, and any division meeting 
the head of the enemy's column firsts must at least hold it in check until 
a larger force arrives. 

"One batfcei-y to a division will, I think, be ampte in the mountains. 
McCook and Crittenden have with them six batteries. Leave all of yours, 
therefore — at least don't take more than two. It will be necessary to 
leave some forc-e with thmn — at least two regiments; and they should be 
covered with breast-works to-uight without fail. 

" I shall order Schoepf's batteries here to be similarly disposed of. There 
must be no delay or failure. The enemy's advance was at the top of Wal- 
dron's Ridge, ten miles from. Chattanooga, night before last, and talked of 
}>eing at McMiunville tomorrow. That" is hardly possible, but they must 
be met at the earliest possible moment. Communicate with McCook 
to-night by a trusty scout. The distance is thirty-two miles. He may 
possibly not be at Tracy City. If not, look for him on the road to Battle 
Creek, If you think best, you may send your artillery to this place, 
which will release the force that would be required to protect them there ; 
though if they will be safe, there is some advantage in having a force at 
McMinnville." Take no wagons except what will be neeessary to carry 
rations and cooking utensils. I shall probably leave here with Sill's 
brigade to-morrow for Tracy City to join you. Communicate always in 
cypher by telegraph to this place, and by courier through Tracy City. 
xSchoepf sends a report that Hardee is advancing on the Dunlap road. 
Answer, so that I may know exactly what you do. Your staff officers 
make mistakes in the use of the cypher." 

I apprehend that further comment on this subject is unnecessary. The 
dispatch in question was in answer to my own inquiry, and had reference 
to the relative merits of .McMinnville and Altamont as battle-grounds. It 
is certain that General Thomas has not consciously laid claim to an idea 
which did not possess him; but I apprehend that developed fact-s have 
been so mingled in his mind with impressions coincident in some particu- 
lars, though essentially different in the material points, that his memory 
has failed to draw the exact distinction between them. It is, however, 
due to him to say that the idea may have been in his mind that Bragg 
might cross the mountain to Sparta, and that he did not distinctly express 
it to me, imagining that I also entertained it myself. 



28 

But I do not propose to draw any advantage from the question wtether 
or not a proposition was made to me to concentrate at Sparta. If it had 
been made, I should have judged it according to its merits, with the lights 
before me at the time, and T do not doubt that T should have rejected it 
on grounds which I will state. 

Besides the road which crosses from Jasper to Decherd, and the one 
which ascends the valley and thence goes to Crossville, there are no less 
than three roads by which the enemy could ascend the mountain to debouch 
from the Sequatchy valley : Firsts the Therman road, which passes through 
or near Altamont, and then branches into at least four roads that descend the 
mountain into the plains of Middle Tennessee, between Decherd and Mc- 
Minnville,. a distance of about forty miles; second, a road which ascends 
the mountain at Dunlap and passes to McMinnville; third, a road which 
ascends the mountain a short distance below Pikeville, and branches on 
the mountain, the left hand branch going to McMinnville, and the right 
hand forking again some twenty miles from McMinnville, one fork going 
to the latter place and the other to Sparta. There is also a road on the 
top of the mountain, connecting all these roads. These geographical 
features would enable the enemy to arrive within twenty miles of McMinn- 
ville by not less than two roads, before determining whether he would 
move on that point or Sparta, and by covering his movements with his 
superior cavah-y force, he could easily arrive within six or eight miles of 
either of those points before his destination could be known at all; and it 
is twenty-two miles at least from jVIcMinnville to Sparta. If I had been 
at Sparta, he could have been at McMinnville and in possession of my line 
of supplies before I could have known it. If I awaited at McMinnville 
the development of his plan, he could have gone to Sparta and pursued his 
course as he did. If I had divided my force between McMinnville and 
Sparta to anticipate him at both points, he could have advanced with rea- 
sonable probiibility of success against either of them; and if the fractions 
should have been so strongly fortified as not to warrant an attack, he coidd 
have avoided them, thrown himself between the two, and thus have forced 
them to retreat separately, or attempt the offensive against a concentrated 
force. General Thomas' own experience at McMinnville in obtaining in- 
formation on which success would have depended, confirms my answer to 
one phase of this proposition, and is applicable to all of them. 

On the 31st he reports: "The general impression is that the enemy is 
advancing, but I have yet to see the person who has seen any of the Chat- 
tanooga forces proper;" and on the 2d of August, in leply to the discre- 
tional instructions heretofore alluded to, he says: "I will stan to-morrow. 
I have heard again that the enemy intends advancing on this place by the 
Therman, Dunlap and Sparta roads. By concentrating at Murfreesboro' we 



29 

shall be within striking distance of this place. By convenient roads our 
main force can be thrown upon the enemy between this and Decherd or 
Hillsboro', overcome him, and drive him toward Sparta, his longest line of 
retreat. A large force of cavalry and light infantry can be pushed across 
the mountains by the Dunlap and Therman roads, attack him in rear, and 
completely rout his whole force. I have studied the roads, and am now 
convinced that this is our best plan of attack." It was afterward ascer- 
tained that the Rebel forces under General Bragg actually commenced to 
arrive at Sparta the day after the date of this dispatch ! 

The reasons which made the concentralion at Murfreesboro' necessary 
and proper may now be briefly summed up: 

It had been supposed that for the lack of supplies on the route the enemy 
would make his march across the mountains rapidly. Several days had 
already elapsed since, from the best information that could be obtained of 
his movements, it was supposed he would have arrived within striking dis- 
tance, and he was still not nearer than the Sequatchy Valley. 

jMy supplies had been cut off for twenty days, and the expectation that 
tlie force in Kentucky would reopen the railroad on which they were 
dependent was frustrated by the invasion of the state by Kirby Smith, 
which, as the result proved, gave more than ample occupation to the raw 
troops that were there. I did not even know what force of that kind 
could be expected, for its organization had only very recently been 
commenced ; and the State had recently been organized into a separate 
department not under my command. I was already reduced to about 
ten days' supply— a little more than that of breadstuff and some minor 
articles, and a good deal less of meat and other articles scarcely less 
essential. The quantity was increased at Nashville a little by the 
collection of flour and meat in the country. General Thomas reported 
on the 2Sth, from McMinnville, that no provisions could be procured 
in that region, and that for forage he could get fodder, but no 
corn ; and his statement in regard to the scarcity in the country is 
confirmed by testimony before the Commission. Such straits did not 
admit of any further delay to await an enemy who could choose 
his own time for the meeting, and who had already been eight days behind 
the time at which I had reason to expect him. An immediate concentra- 
tion at a point nearer the source of supply, from which I was separated 
two hundred and sixty miles, was clearly necessary. It promised the only 
means of opening the railroad, and still holding Nashville, the possession 
of which was believed to be the enemy's first object. 

But the concentration at Murfreesboro' was expedient on other grounds. 
I could not have concentrated at any point as far in advance as McMinn- 
ville more than about thirty-one thousand men, and that force was not suf- 



30 

ficient to attack Bragg's army united at any point. If I could liave taken 
any position in which I could force or induce him to attack without delay, 
it would have been well; but such was not the case. In this uncertainty 
as to the time he might delay, and as to the route on which he would strike 
in force, while perhaps threatening by other routes, screened as he was by 
a range of mountains; with our communications with Louisville completely 
severed, and our supplies already reduced to a narrow margin, perhaps to 
be entirely exhausted when the advance of the enemy would make rapid 
operations necessary, it was plainly necessary to concentrate at some point 
nearer our base, by which means my effective force would be increased so 
as to be sufficient to meet the enemy whenever he should come, and still 
have enough to open our communications. 

The plan of operations presented in the evidence of another witness of 
rank before the Commission, was to concentrate the array at Murfreesboro' 
as soon as the Rebel army commenced its advance from Chattanooga- 
This, except as to the time of the concentration, is the plan that was actually 
executed. The earlier execution of it would not have affected the result, 
but the distribution of my small cavalry force to guard the various passes 
across the mountains, from forty to sixty miles distant — which was one 
feature of the plan, — could only have resulted in the capture or dispersion 
of the whole of them whenever the enemy chose to effect it. As for the 
idea of first concentrating at Murfreesboio, and then advancing to attack 
the enemy at Sparta, it must suppose that the enemy would wait seven or 
eifht days at that place to be attacked, which he did not do. I do not, 
therefore, see any advantage in this variation of the plan that was adopted; 
and if it had been submitted to my judgment, I should have rejected it. 

Two witnesses of high rank, in anf<wor to a question as to points north 
of the Cumberland river at which Bragg's army "could have been attacked 
with a prospect of success," expressed the o])inion that it might have been 
done at Glasgow. This opinion was undoubtedly expressed without reflec- 
tion, unless it referred to the advantage which the locjility of Glasgow 
would have afforded for the attacking army, in case of a collision there, 
and not to the possibility of intercepting Bragg's array at that point; for 
the testimony of these two witnesses shows, and the map shows, that until 
Bragg's army crossed the Cumberland river and took up its march north- 
ward, it was impossible to know from its movements whether its plan was 
to go into Kentucky, or turn to the west against Nashville; that it is 
fifty miles from the Cumberland River where Bragg crossed it to Glas- 
gow, while it is ninety-five miles from Nashville, where my army was, to 
Glasgow; and from these facts the witnesses ailmit that it was not possible 
to have intercepted Braggs army at that point, unless he had tarried 
there. In point of fact, the evidence shows that on the 7th of September 



31 

I learned tliat a portion of Bragg's army had crossed the Cumberland 
river at Carthage, and was moving northward, probably towards Bowling 
Green, where I had caused some supplies to be accumulated by the way of 
Green river; and that I immediately ordered a portion of my army to 
march for that point. That, on the 10th, I learned what was before un- 
known, if not improbable, that another portion had crossed at Gainesboro, 
and had probably marched in the same direction; and that I ordered 
other divisions, making six, for the same point, accompanying them my- 
self. That this movement was made rapidly, the last of the six divisions 
arriving at Bowling Green Monday morning, the 15th, which was the time 
at which the rear of Bragg's army passed Glasgow. Thus, after gaining 
intelligence of his passage over the Cumberland River, I moved my army 
sixty-five miles, while he was moving fifty with the advantage of two 
I'oads, and I was still thirty miles in rear of him. 

The same process of demonstration will show that, even if I had known 
he was going by Munfordsville, and if there had been nothing to delay ' 
me an hour at Bowling Green, I could not have intercepted him at Mun- 
fordsville, because I h.'id one hundred and five miles to march, while he had 
but sixty-eight— the distance fi'om Glasgow to Munfordsville being eighteen 
miles. In fact, his advance actually attacked the latter place the day befoie 
my sixth division i-eached Bowling Green. But, furthermore, it was not 
yet to be assumed that his destination was Cential Kentucky; on the con- 
trary, Glasgow was an important position for him. It effectually com- 
manded my line of communication with my base of supplies, while he had 
two lines open — one with the East Tennessee Railroad, which was his per- 
manent base, and also with the valley of the Cumberland; and the ether 
with Central Kentucky, where the occupation of Kirby Smith had estab- 
lished for him a second base. 

Munfordsville did not offer the same advantages; for, althouo-b a much 
stronger natural position, yet in taking it he gave up his communications 
with Tennessee, and rendered those with Kirby Smith less secure against a 
force operating from the Ohio River, supposing Louisville to be secure 
to us. At Munfordsville his communication with Kirby Smith must 
have been along the Louisville Turnpike, and thence across to Bards- 
town; while at Glasgow it would be along the old Lexington road through 
Summerville and Lebanon, or through Columbia and Lebanon or Liberty, 
by all of which roads I have moved large bodies of troops. Besides, at 
Munfordsville he would have been in a much less productive region than at 
Glasgow. These considerations, taken in connection with the risk he 
would run by advancing further into Kentucky, made it at least reasonably 
doubtful whether he would not halt at Glasgow. The fact that his purpose 
was to penetrate still further into Kentucky, and that he had designs on 



32 

Louisville, was only known when it was ascertained that he had left Glas- 
gow, and through correspondence which was captured subsequent to that 
time. But supposing it had been reasonably certain that Bardstown was his 
destination, it was not to be assumed that he would go by the way of Mun- 
fordsville; on the contrary, it is undoubtedly true that bul for the bait which 
was offered to him in the garrison at that place, he would not have gone 
there at all; for the simple reason that without any object whatever it would 
have taken ten or twelve miles off the direct and excellent turnpike from 
Glasgow to Bardstown and thrown him on another road not so good, and 
twelve miles longer. This brings me naturally to the question of the relief 
of Munfordsville. 

The foregoing explanations show that 1 et)uld not have reached Mun- 
fordsville in advance of the rebel force, even if it had been desirable to 
leave it between me and Nashville. The first information received at 
Bowling Green that Munfordsville was attacked or threatened was on the 
14th, and the report was that it had been captured, though that was not 
certain. On the same day the last of five of my divisions arrived at 
Bowling Green ; and on the same day. as was afterward ascertained, the 
main body of the rebel army marched from Glasgow, eighteen miles from 
Munfordsville, with the advantage of two roads. If I had moved forward 
at once I could not have reached Munfordsville in less than four days, for, 
considering that I must march on one road, it would, for the rear of my 
column, have been equivalent in time to a march of sixty miles ; and in 
the presence of an enemy whose position was not known, the march could 
not well have been made more rapidly. As for reinforcing the garrison by 
the first of my divisions which arrived at Bowling Green, even if the neces- 
sity of it could have been known, it would have been out of the question ; 
for those divisions would have been thrown into the midst of the ^vhole 
rebel force, a folly which, it appears, the enemy actually anticipated, and 
prepared to reap the fruit of. 

But I propose to inquire also what necessity there was for such relief, 
and on what grounds it could reasonably have been expected that I would 
furnish it. It is apparent from a study of the map, and the evidence 
shows, that the possession of Munfordsville was not essential to Bragg's 
army in a stragetical point of view. At least two other preferable routes 
were open to him ; whether his object w^as to attack Louisville directly, or 
to advance into Central Kentucky for other purposes : First, the shorter 
and better road from Glasgow to Bardstown and thence on to Louisville; 
second, the old Lexington road to Lebanon ; third, the road through 
Columbia, Liberty and Danville. He would not in any event take the 
road to the mouth of Salt River, because it threw him more away from the 
base of supplies which Kirby Smith's presence had established in Central 



33 

Kentucky ; because it made his junction with Kirby Smith more difficult 
and uncertain ; and because it placed him in the angle l>etw€en the Ohio 
and Salt rivers, neither of which could he cross without ferrying or bridging. 
The same facts made the possession of Munfordsville a matter of no 
stragetieal value to us. Its importance, therefore, was determined by the 
value of the bridge, which alone it was intended to protect as a link in the 
chain of communication between the troops farther South, and Louisville, 
their base of supplies. The bridge, if destroyed, could be rebuilt in a 
w^eek — was actually rebuilt in about ten days ; and as the principal part of 
the force which drew supplies across the bridge was coming north, its 
preservation was not of immediate importance. I have been disposed to 
say, therefore, that the determination to hold the bridge was an error of 
judgment; but I will not now assert that it was so, seeing that doubt 
existed as to the probability of Bragg's coming that way, and that the 
commander considered himself able to hold his position against the force 
which at first tlireatened him. If it was evident that Bragg would come 
against the place with his whole or any considerable part of his army, then 
it is certain that to attempt to hold it was an error, for no position could 
be less tenable for a small force against a very large one. It must be 
apparent that the possession of Munfordsville was of no importance that 
would justify the jeopardizing any considerable force to hold it, and the 
evidence shows that for two days and a half after the first attack the way 
was open for the withdrawal of the garrison. Its relief from the direction 
of Bowling Green was, therefore, unnecessary, if it had been possible. 
Let us see now how far the place was considered to be in jeopardy, and 
on what ground it was reasonable to expect relief from Bowling Green. 

It appears that on Saturdi;y, the 13th, the commanding officer learned that 
a force, represented to be seven thousand strong, was advancing upon his 
post from the direction of Glasgow; that he reported the fact to his 
isuperiors at Louisville, saying, '-If I had one more good i-egiment and a 
few more pieces of attillery that force could not take me. As it is I shall 
do my best to prevent it. Can you send me reinforcements to-night? I 
shall send train to Salt River for them." To which he received in reply, 
" I send you what you ask." The same day he also reports, "Some indi- 
cations that the main rebel force are going toward Lebanon," and that his 
entrenchments would be finished that night. These reports were certainly 
not alarming, and did not indicate that he expected or required assistance 
from Bowling Green, however desirous he might be to see a force coming 
from that quarter. On the same day he sent scouts to Bowling Green 
with verbal messages. These scouts could not have carried word that he 
was in jeopardy and required help from there, for his superiors 
had given him all he thought necessary at that time, and as yet 
5 



34 

no force had appeared in front of him. I now remember that 
the scout Miller came to me, but so little was there in his com- 
munications to me different from the information I deriyed from 
unauthorized persons, that I had forgotten, nor do I now remember, that 
he came as a messenger. He knew less about the enemy, and scarcely if 
any more about the garrison than others, especially one who came from 
the vicinity of the fort the morning of the attack and reported quite 
confidently that the garrison had surrendered. Those persons reported 
first to the commanding officer at Bowling Green, and he had no better 
recollection of the special object and importance of their mission than 
myself. Nor could it at any rate have altered the case. I must of 
necessity have operated against the rebel army, which was already virtually 
between me and Munfordsville. There was no communication between 
me and the commander in Kentucky, and knowing that the rebel army 
was between me and Munfordsville, he had no reasonable assurance that I 
could succor that place. It was not under my command, I really knew 
nothing of its condition, and I could not suppose that it would be need- 
lessly exposed to so large a force. 

All the information I had led to the supposition that Bragg's army was 
probably yet at Glasgow, and on Tuesday afternoon, the 16th, I marched 
with six divisions, (one being still in the rear) in three columns, to 
attack the enemy if he should be at that place. The facts shown in 
evidence that the last of those six divisionn had only arrived after a march 
of fifteen miles the day before, with very rapid and fatiguing ones on 
previous days; that some time was necessarily required to make arrange- 
ments with reference to the garrison and trains that were to remain ; 
that supplies had to be distributed, and that the supply of provisions was 
imperfect, making it necessary to collect breadstuff's from the country to 
supply the troops, will amply justify this short delay. The troops in 
three columns hatl to start upon the main turnpike road from Bowling 
Green to Munfordsville, but successively turned upon roads which con- 
verge on Glasgow. The cavalry thrown in advance reported on Tuesday 
night that the enemy had left Glasgow, and the following day my army 
marched to Cave City and Ilorsewell, within ten miles of Munfordsville. 
During that day I heard of the surrender of Munfordsville, and on the 
night of that day the commanding officer of the post reported to me at 
Preuitt's Knobb, with his troops on parole. 

The position at Munfordsville is one of great natural strength for 
a large force. I understand that it was the subject of dissatisfaction 
that the rebel army was not attacked in that position ; but 1 have 
never heard that the feeling was concurred in by the officers of 
higher rank, several of whom, distinguished before and since for 



35 

gallant coriduet, "have testified that sucli aii attack woxild not have 
been judicious under the circumstances. The advantage of position 
in favor of the enemy must have made the result at least doubtful, 
and even a very serious check, in the exhausted condition of our 
supplies, would have been disastrous. I could have avoided the 
enemy by passing to either side of him, but I deemed it all important to 
force him further into the state, instead of allowing him. to fall back upon 
Bowling Grreen and Nashville; and I matured a plan and detiermined to 
attack there rather than allow him that course. I believed that the condi- 
tion of his supplies would compel him to abandon his position ; aad I was 
very well satisfied when that proved to be the case. He commenced to 
withdraw on the night of the 20th, and my advance drove out his rear 
guard, after some skirmishing, on the 21st, The march was continued, 
and skirmishing was kept up with his rear guard until he turned off 
towards Bardstown, 

3fany considerations rendered it proper to direct my march on 
Louisville, instead of following his route. The want of supplies made 
it necessary, manj of the troops being out bj the time they reached 
the mouth of Salt river. This reason would have been iusu}>erable if, as 
was not impr<3bable, the enemy should concentrate his foix>e and throw 
himself rapidly between nie and Louisville. The junction of Bi-agg and 
Kirby Smith was not only possible but probable. It would have made 
their combined force greatly superior to me in strength, and such a dispo- 
sition would have placed him l)etweeu two inferior forces, which, from their 
positions, could not have acted in concert against him, and which, there- 
fore, were liable to be beaten iia detail. One of these forces, that occupy- 
ing Louisville, wa,s composed of perfectly ram^, undisciplined and in a 
measure unarmed troops, with but very little artillery, and very few officers 
of rank or experience. It could not have withstood the veteran rebel 
army two hours, and the consequence of its defeat and the capture of 
Louisville would have been disastrous in the exti-eme. That force, how- 
ever, mixed judiciously with my old troops, could be made to render good 
service, as the result proved. 

These considerations determined me to concentrate rapidly at Louis- 
ville. The last division reached that point on the 29th of Septem- 
ber. On the same day the incorp<eration of the new troops with 
the old, and other preparations which a long and fatiguing march of 
the old troops and the inefficiency of the new rendered necessary, 
were completed, and on the morning of the 30th the consolidated army 
was prepared to march against the rebel forces which occupied the princi- 
pal part of Kentucky. The campaign which ensued, and which resulted 
in the expulsion of the enemy from the State, has been sketched in my 



36 

official report of the 4th of November, herewith appended. As far as 
the facts are concerned, the investigations of this Commission have shown^ 
perhaps, that I did not make allowance enough for the diminution of my 
force by absentees, and stragglers from the new regiments; and that, there- 
fore, I probably over-estimated my own strength at and after the battle of 
Perryville, if I did not also under-estimate the combined strength of the 
enemy. These investigations also give reason to believe that the aggregate 
loss of the enemy during the campaign was greater than I represented, 
and they have developed additional interesting incidents; but they point 
to no statement which I could now desire to alter. I shall limit myi^elf^ 
therefore, to the elucidation of certain particulars in which the wisdom of 
my act-s would seem to have been called 'n\to question by the course of the 
investigation. 

The battle of Perryville, although but a partial, and by no means as 
fruitful a contest as I had expected, was not without important and grati- 
fying results. I shall notice very briefly the causes which prevented it 
from being more so. 

When, on the 5th of October, Braggs army proper retired from Bards- 
town, it was uncertain where it would unite with the force of Kirby Smithy 
though Danville was the point where I most expected to find them, and 
my corps were accordingly directed on Perryville and Harvodsburg, 
When, on the night of the 6th, I ascertained that Kirby Smith had 
crossed the Kentucky River at Saliva, Harrodsburg or Perryville became 
the most probable point of concentration, and the destination of the corp& 
which was marching on Harrodsburg, had to be changed to Perryville- 
Information during the 7th, that the enemy were turning towards Har- 
rodsburg, inclined me to suppose, though not confidently, that Harrods- 
burg, and not Perryville, would be the point. In the movement on that 
place, the center corps, with which I was, marched by a shorter and better 
road, and therefore arrived within about three miles of Perryville on the 
evening of the 7th, while the other corps were expected to be still about 
seven miles in rear, on their respective roads to the right and left. 

Finding a sufficient force at Perryville on the evening of the 7th to stop 
our progress without a general engagement of the corps, it was presumed 
that the enemy had determined to make his stand there ; and the follow- 
ing instructions were sent to General McCook : 

"^ October 7 — 8 P. M. 
"General — The Third Corps (Gilbert's) is within three and a half 
miles of Perryville, the cavalry being nearer — probably within two and a 
half miles. From all the information gained to-day, it seems pr()l)ablc that 
the enemy will resist our advance into the town. They are said to have a 
strong force in and near the place. There is no water here, and we will 
get but little, if any, until we get it at Perryville. We expect to attack 



37 

and carry the place tomorrow. March, at three o\-Iock precisely to-morroW 
morning, without fail, and move up till the head of your column gets to 
within about three or three and a half miles of Perryville; that is to say, 
until you are abreast of the Third Corps. The left of this corps rests 
near Bottom's place. Perhaps Captain Williams, Jackson's cavalry, will 
know where it is. From the point of the road Gilbert is now on across 
direct to your road is about two and a half or three miles. When the 
head of your column gets to the vicinity designated, (three or three and a 
half miles from town) halt and form it in order of battle, and let the rear 
close well up ; then let the men rest in position and be luade as comfortable 
as possible, but do not permit them to scatter. Have the country on your 
front examined, a reconnoissance made, and collect all the information 
possible in regard to the enemy, and the country and roads in your vicin- 
ity, and then report in 2)crson, as quickly as practicable, to these head- 
quarters. If your men have an opportunity to get water of any kind, 
they must fill their canteens, and the officers must caution them particu- 
larly to use it in the most sparing manner. Send to the rear every wagon 
and animal which is not required with your column. All the usual precau- 
tions nu\st be taken, and preparations made for action. Keep all teams 
back except ammunition and ambulances. Nothing has been heard from 
you to-day. Send orderlies by bearer to learn the locality of these head- 
quarters. The General desires to see Captain Williams, Jackson's cavalry, 
by seven o'clock in the morning at these headquarters. 
" Respectfully, &c., 
[Signed] "James B. Fry, Colonel and Chief of Staif." 

Similar instructions, but suited to the locality on which he was to form 
for the attack, were given to General Thomas, who, as second in command, 
was with the right corps, 

It was expected that these instructions would get these two corps into 
position for the attack by seven or eight o'clock in the morning; whereas, 
in consequence of delays which were more or less unavoidable, the heads 
of the columns did not come up until between ten and eleven o'clock, and 
the rear division of the right corps did not get into position until about 
four o'clock. This rendered it improbable that the attack could be made 
until next morning ; and was one of the causes which marred the success 
I confidently expected. Afterward the lateness of the hour at which I 
received intelligence of the condition of afi"airs on the left, rendered it 
impossible to reap the fruit that would otherwise still have remained. 

It has been a matter of surprise that so .severe an engagement could 
have taken place within two miles and a half of my headquarters without 
my knowledge. The commander of an army covering a line six or seven 
miles long, intei'spersed with woods and hills, must of necessity depend on 
the reports of his Generals for information of what is transpiring on 
different parts of the field. After the failure to get into position as soon 
as I had expected, I no longer anticipated a battle that day ; but a good 
deal of artillei-y firing had been going on between the advanced guards of 
the two armies since our arrival the evening before, excepting at night. 



38 

The cause of this was well understood, and the greater or less rapidity of 
the firing at intervals was not a matter to attract particular attention ; 
especially as it was to be expected that information of any thing of seri- 
ous import would be promptly conveyed to me. For that reason 1 received 
with astonishment the intelligence of the severe fighting that commenced 
at two o'clock. Not a musket shot had been heard, nor did the sound of 
artillery indicate any thing like a battle. This was probably caused by 
the configuration of the ground, which broke the sound, and by the heavy 
wind which it appears blew from the right to the left during the day, 
though the latter I had not thought of until it was established in evidence 
before the Commission. Be that as it may, many witnesses, without 
exception, have testified to the absence of all reason to suppose at my 
headquarters that a battle was I'aging, and the testimony of hundreds 
more could have been adduced to the same efi"ect. 

It has been asked why, after the battle of Perryville, I did not imme- 
diately follow the enemy to Harrodsburg, without waiting for Sill's Divi- 
sion to come up. That the entire rebel army could have been brought to 
battle there I have no doubt. The forces were nearly equal on both 
sides — on one side nearly all veteran troops under perfect discipline; on 
the other a portion, the "Old Army of the Ohio," equally good, but 
more than one-third of the whole raw and undisciplined. The enemy would 
have had the advantage of the strong position which he selected. The 
result of a conflict under such circumstances is not to be predicted. I am 
not willing to admit that I might have failed; and yet no man can assert 
that the result ought certainly to have been otherwise under the circum- 
stances. It was sufficient for me that I could make it reasonably certain 
by waiting for my troops to come up. 

My studies have taught me that battles are only to be fought for some 
important object; that success must be rendered reasonably certain if pos- 
sible — the more certain the better; that if the result is reasonably uncertain 
battle is only to be sought when very serious disadvantage must result from 
a failure to fight, or when the advantages of a possible victory tar out- 
weigh the consequences of probable defeat. These rules suppose that war 
has a higher object than that of mere bloodshed; and military history points 
for study and commendation to campaigns which have been conducted over 
a large field of operations with important results, and without a single gen- 
eral engagement. In my judgment the commander merits condemnation 
who, from ambition or ignorance, or a weak submission to the dictation of 
popular clamor, and without necessity or profit, has squandered the lives of 
his soldiers. In this connection it is proper to review the circumstance.s 
which should have weight upon the question of hastening a battle at the 
particular juncture referred to. 



39 

There is not, I venture to say, a particle of evidence upon the records 
of this Commission which does not lead to the conclusion that the object 
and intention of the rebel Government, in the invasion of Kentucky last 
summer, was to hold possession of the State by force of arms, and secure 
it to the cause of the rebellion. The circumstances of the invasion, and 
the formidable force employed in it ; the advance of the smaller force, under 
Kirby Smith, which established depots and collected supplies, that made 
comparatively easy and safe the subsequent advance of the main force 
under General Bragg to a point so remote from its original base; the 
further reinforcement of this large force by the column under Breckin- 
ridge, at the very time when, if a temporary raid had been the object, the 
main force should have been rapidly withdrawing instead of reinforcing; 
the deliberation and permanency with which the invading army maintained 
its position in the face of the force which was preparing to drive it out; 
the inauguration of a provisional State government under the authority of 
the Confederate Government; the enforcement of the conscription and 
other Confederate laws ; the avowal of the Confederate authorities ; the 
plan of campaign sketched in the letter of General Beauregard to his 
Government; the convictions of the people of Kentucky from what they 
saw, and the assurance of the rebel authorities; the constant and confi- 
dent declarations of all persons connected with the invading force; the 
disappointment and disapprobation which the whole Southern press ex- 
pressed at the result — all go to show that the object of the invasion was 
permanent occupation. That object could only be secured by giving bat- 
tle to and destroying or driving from the field the army which was opposed 
to it. 

Such a plan and determination was also clearly indicated by the 
movements of the enemy after the commencement of my march from 
Louisville. If his object had been to retreat without a struggle, as soon 
as I moved against liim, the force of Kirby Smith, which was then at va- 
rious points north of the Kentucky river, would at once have moved by 
the roads concentrating at Richmond, and thence on to Cumberland Gap. 
It was for that force the shortest and best road, and a better route for 
supplies than the one it pursued. The main force under Bragg would 
have moved on one or more of the roads which converge upon Glasgow, 
through New Haven, Lebanon and other points. This line would have 
given him the advantage of marching by several of the best roads in the 
state, converging at convenient distances. It would have taken him 
through a region of country where supplies were comparatively abundant; 
it would have enabled him to concentrate his army at Bowling Green, and 
perhaps capture that place before he could be overtaken; or, if not, to 
move upon Murfreesbero, where he would have railroad communication 



40 

with Chattanooga, and good lines of retreat to the other side of the Ten- 
nessee river, if necessary, or the opportunity of capturing Nashville, if 
he should deem that feasible. Or, if he desired to retreat through Cum- 
berland Gap, he would go on through Danville and Stanford. Instead, 
however, of starting upon these natural lines of retreat toward Tennessee, 
Kirby iSniith moved west, entirely off his line of retreat, and crossed the 
Kentucky river near Salvisa; and Bragg, after turning the angle at Perry- 
ville, moved northward, the very opposite of his direction of retreat. 
That the original object of this movement was to concentrate the whole 
rebel force at Harrodsburg, instead of Camp Dick Robinson, is evident, 
from the fact that if the latter had been the object, Kirby Smith would 
have moved directly to that point, over the Hickman bridge, instead of 
fording the river lower down to go out of his way, and Bragg would have 
marched through Danville to the same point. Thus the circumstances of 
the invasion indicated that there would be a formidable struggle for the 
possession of the state; and the movements of the rebel forces to meet 
the operations that were in progress against them, pointed to a great battle 
at or near Harrodsburg. 

The battle of Perryville, by every reasonable explanation, increased 
instead of weakening the probability of a great battle at Harrodsburg. 
It has been asserted that Ceneral Bragg fought the battle of Perryville 
with portions of three divisions, only about fifteen thousand men. It is 
certain that he fought it with only a part of his whole force. His motive, 
therefore, may be supposed to have been either to check my advance to 
give time to take up a position with his main force beyond, or else be- 
cause he hoped to gain some advantage by striking the head of my column ; 
supposing I was moving on only one road, before I could get a superior 
force up to oppose him. In either case, he could not have expected to ac- 
complish much more than he did in this partial engagement. He was 
repulsed, it is true, but not until night protected him from very serious 
consequences, and there was nothing in the result that should have de- 
cided the fate of so important a campaign. His loss was probably much 
less than mine, from the fact that the attack was made when my troops 
were in column, and to that extent unprepared. 

That General Bragg moved to Camp Dick Robinson, instead of await- 
ing an attack by my whole force, at Harrodsburg, is no evidence that he 
would not have been willing to give battle to the part of it which I had 
at Perryville. With an equal force he could safely risk a battle in the 
strong position he could have taken, and in fact did select, when the result 
would by no means be as certain there, against a superior force, as it would 
be in the still stronger position of Camp Dick Robinson, which had the 
further advantage of being a depot for his supplies. For these reasons, 



41 

ai\d on account of its inaccessibility and superior strength, neither did his 
withdrawal to Camp Dick Eohiiison indicate an intention to abandon the 
object of his campaign and retreat precipitately from the state. These 
reasons justified the conclusion that the rebel army was to be encountered 
in battle, notwithstanding critics after the fact may answer that the 
result contradicts the conclusion; and they justify every reasonable pre- 
caution to have made the success of such a struggle certain. They aiFord 
an interpretation to the movements of the army under my command sub- 
sequently to the battle of Perry vi lie. 

Pending the arrival of Greneral Sills division, the left corps, General 
McCook's, laid near Dicksville, from which a road extends to Harrods- 
burg; the center, General Grilbert's, was abreast of the left on the direct 
road from Perry ville to Harrodsburg; and the right, General Critten- 
den's, was on Salt River about four miles from Danville. Cavalry 
was in front on the Harrodsburg and Danville roads. A good 
deal of the ammunition of McCook's corps and some in the cen- 
ter corps, had been expended in- the battle of the 8th, and 
so much of the means of transportation had been required for provis- 
ions, that wagons could not be spared for a sufficient supply of reserve 
ammunition, on starting from Louisville. This was hurried forward, and 
other matters attended to in the condition of the army which had resulted 
from the battle. These of themselves would not have delayed my move- 
ments, though they were important. 

General Sills division arrived on the evening of tlie 11th, and the army 
was ordered to move on the 12th. Strong cavalry reconnoissanees had 
been kept out every day, but on the evening of the 10th, I ordered out 
three brigades of infantry with cavalry to move on the 11th to discover 
more of the position or movements of the enemy. One moved beyond 
Danville toward Camp Dick Robinson ; one on the Danville and Harrods- 
burg road toward the latter point ; and the third, toward the same point 
on the Perryville and Harrodsburg road. About daylight, an officer, just 
in from Harrodsburg, came to my tent and reported to me with great 
earnestness that the enemy was moving against us in force from Harrods- 
burg, distant about eight miles. The troops were put in position to be 
prepared, if the report should prove true, and in the meantime the several 
reconnoissanees proceeded as ordered. The one on the left discovered and 
reported the enemy apparently in force about two miles south of Har- 
rodsburg early in the morning ; but he withdrew during the day, and the 
two reconnoissanees which were ordered toward Harrodsburg entered 
that place in the evening, capturing some property and a large number of 
sick, wounded and some other prisoners. 

It was probable that the enemy had retired to Camp Dick Robinson, but 
6 



42 

it was reported that some at least had gone in the direction of the Ken- 
tucky river, and it was necessary to ascertain the fact. It woukl require 
a day to do that by reconnoissance. If the reconnoisance were supported 
in force, we should be prepared to take advantage of the contingency of 
the enemy still being this side of Dick's River; and, in any event, no time 
would be lost in the movement to turn the position at Camp Dick Robin- 
son, if it should be found that the enemy had actually retired to that 
place. On the 12th, therefore, the whole army swung around on Danville 
as a pivot — the right and center on the Danville and Harrodsburg road, 
and the left near Harrodsburg on the Perryville and Harrodsburg road, 
while a reconnoissance was pushed forward to gain the desired informa- 
tion. It ascertained that the enemy had crossed Dicks River. 

If it should be said that these dispositions proved to have been unneces- 
sary by the withdrawal of the enemy, il may be answered that such may 
be the case with nine out of ten of the dispositions that are made in every 
campaign; that batiles occur only occasionally in the movements of oppos- 
ing armies; but that preparation for battle may be necessary every day. 
Without such preparation battles may be multiplied; and so in most cases 
are defeats to the careless. 

The enemy's position in rear of Dick's River being, from the character 
of that stream, impregnable in front, I moved on the 13th to turn it by the 
south. On the night of that day I heard that the enemy was retreating 
from Camp Dick Robinson toward the south, and 1 immediately ordered 
pursuit. The leading division marched at twelve o'clock that night, and 
the others following in rapid succession. Crittenden's and McCook's corps, 
the former leading, took the road to Stanford and Crab Orchard, while 
Gilbert's took the road to Lancaster and Crab Orchard. On both roads 
the enemy's rear guards were overtaken the next day, and were pressed 
continually as far as Loudon. No general battle occurred between the two 
armies, though the enemy was foiled in his object and driven from the 
State. Anticipating a movement of the Rebel army into Middle Tennessee, 
the Army of the Ohio moved promptly in that direction, and on the 31st of 
October had, under my orders, advanced as far as Bowling Green and 
Glasoow. It was my intention to have reached MurtVeesboro' by the lOih 
of November. On the 30th of October I turned over the command to 
Maior-General Rosecrans, in obedience to orders from the General-in-Ckief. 
A careful study of the topography of Central Kentucky shows it to be 
a region possessing remarkable strategical features for defensive opera- 
tions, especially for a force whose line of retreat is toward the state of 
Tennessee. The Kentucky river, running across the state from east to 
west, with its cliffy banks, makes a strong line of defense ; while its some- 
what frequent fords, opposing but slight obstacles to the movements of an 



43 

army when the river is low, yet easily defended from the opposite bank, 
make it an admirable line for a retreating army to take shelter behind, 
and a perfect cnrtain to cover ulterior movements. Its advantages in this 
respect are very greatly increased by the character and position of Dick's 
river, w^hich, coming from the south, empties into the Kentucky river 
where the latter makes a strong bend to the north. Dick's river has the 
same characteristics of cliffy banks, and its fewer crossings make it a much 
stronger line of defense than the Kentucky Eiver. 

Together these streams make the position of Camp Dick Robinson in the 
fork almost impregnable for a large array, except from the south-east. In 
that case ihe defensive army, with its right flank protected by Dick River 
and its left by the broken ground to the east, may fall back easily and 
securely to the north side of the Kentucky, and by a short march either to 
the east or the west recross to the south side, and fall upon good lines of 
retreat; and these movements can only be counteracted by considerable 
detours, or by previous detachments, which would weaken tbe opposing 
army so much as to endanger the main attack, unless tbe army is very 
greatly superior in strength. On the north side of the Kentucky River the 
country is traversable by good roads between the Lexmgton and Richmond 
road, and any of the roads crossing the river lower down; but on the south 
side the country bordering the river between the mouth of Dick's River and 
the Lexington and Richmond road is destitute of practicable roads parallel 
with the river. Besides the advantages already alluded to, the whole of 
that region of country abounds in strong positions commanding the only 
water for an army within several miles; so that the attacking force is forced 
to fight under all the disadvantage of exhaustion for the wajit of it, as was 
the case at PerryviHe. 

These details make it easy to answer the theories that have been advanced 
for the annihilation or capture of the entire rebel army under General 
Bragg. One ot those theories assumes that that army might have been 
destroyed in crossing Dick's River. 

A defile, if it does not retard the march materially, is always a benefit to 
a retreating army; and the line of Dick's River is admirably adapted to such 
an object. It is only necessary for the retreating army to make demonstra- 
tions of battle with a strong rear guard, which will require corresponding 
preparations and delay on the part of the pui-suer. In the mean time, it 
throws its artillery across rapidly to take positions to sweep the opposite 
bank, and under .such protection the remainder of tbe retiring army crosses 
with safety. 

Great stress has been laid on the importance of Danville to cut off the 
retreat of the rebel army from Perryville. My right rested after the battle 
within four or five miles of Danville, and my cavalry watched and went 



44 

beyond that place. Danville controlled no line of retreat for the enemj, 
except through that point and thence on toward Somerset or Columbia. 
That was as well covered by being four or five miles from Danville, with a 
perfectly open and unobstructed country between, as it would have been at 
Danville itself; and the enemy did not attempt to use it at all. Danville is- 
eight miles at the nearest point from the r€>ad going from Camp Dick Rob- 
inson to Cumberland Gap, and the strong line ©f Dick's River between, 
prevents Danville from having any command of that road. 

The first point at which the enemy's retreat on ti e Cumberland Gap road 
could be intercepted is Lancaster, ten miles from Danville. If tiie Army 
of the Ohio moved to Lancaster in force, in advance of the rebel army, it. 
threw its communications into the hands of the enemy; if, before being 
assured that the enemy had crossed Dick's River, it divided its force over 
the twenty miles from Perryville to Lancaster to protect its communications 
and intercept the retreat of the enemy through Lancaster, it lendered itself 
liable to be beaten in detail; and if, after being assured that the enemy had 
crossed Dick's River, it left small detachments sufScient to guard the passes 
over that river, and then moved with the main body on Lancaster, there is 
no reason why the enemy should nof have been able to hold it in check on 
the line of Dick's River long enough to secure his line through Lancas- 
ter if he was determined to retreat. 

An army on ordinary marches, continued for many days, will average 
about two miles an hour ; but in a forced march for twenty, and at least, 
for ten miles, it can average three miles an hotir. If the rebel army had 
sixty tliousand men, with artillery, and fifteen hundred wagons for baggage, 
supplies, &c., it would, in marching, occvipy thirty-nine miles along the 
road in one column, or nineteen and a half miles each in two columns. It 
would therefore require six hours and a half to clear its camp on two 
roads; the whole of it will have arrived at or passed a point twenty miles. 
distant in fourteen hours, or a point ten miles distant in ten hours. Thus 
the rebel army, moving from Camp Dick Robinson in two columns, would 
clear its camp in six hours and a half^ and arrive at Lancaster, ten miles 
distant, in ten hours; or, if it continued on without stopping, would arrive 
at Crab Orchard, twenty miles distant, in fourteen hours. 

It appears that the retreating army actually marched in three columns, 
from its camp at Dick Robinson, the country along its route being open 
and practicable. From Lancaster it took two roads, the one to the left 
going by the way of Lowell, and coming into the Cumberland Gap road at 
Big Hill, and the other going through Crab Orchard, Mount Vernon and 
London. The latter is intersected at Crab Orchard, twenty miles from 
Danville, by the road from Danville through Stanford. The reasons which 
would render it injudicious to expose my communications and leave open 



45 

a better line of retreat to the enemy, by anticipating his posssible retreat 
through Lancaster, apply with greater force to Crab Orchard. If the 
rebel army would retreat without accepting battle, the topograpliy of the 
country made it entirely possible for it to do so. Being once established 
on its line of retreat beyond any point where it could by any possibility 
be intercepted, the rebel army made good its retreat, as other armies have 
done in this and other wars, under less favorable circumstances. 

There are few circumstances under which a disciplined and well man- 
aged army can be forced to a general battle against its will ; though the 
occasions are multiplied, if the opposing army has a greatly superior force 
of good cavalry, or is so greatly superior in strength that it can divide its 
force with reasonable prospects of success to each fraction. A disciplined 
army, moving on its line of communication, can always retreat more rap- 
idly than it can be pursued. It meets or overtakes its supplies on the 
road, or finds them at temporary depots previously established, or it col- 
lects them from the country as much as possible on its line of march. 
The pursuing army, on the other hand, finds the country stripped ; it has 
nothing in advance to rely on ; it must cari-y everything along, with the 
hindrance of enormous trains ; and the difficulties are increased with every 
day's march. The retreating army prepares a front of resistance more 
rapidly than the pursuer can prepare a front for attack. The strong posi- 
tions are reconnoitered in advance, on which the requisite force forms as 
rapidly as on a drill ground; while the pursuer, ignorant of the ground, 
and of the force that awaits him, must inform himself of both in order to 
develop a corresponding force, or else find the head of his column beaten 
back. In the meantime the main body of the retiring army has gained 
some hours march ; the rear guard watches the enemy's preparation, 
awaits his attack and repvilses it if it is made injudiciously or with insuffi- 
cient force ; or else, at dark, resumes its march to repeat the same opera- 
tion whenever it is necessary and the occasion is favorable. A single tree 
felled judiciously across the road will delay the pursuer perhaps fifteen 
minutes; four of them at intervals will delay him an hour; and thus the 
distance between him and his adversary is increased. 

These advantages to defensive operations do not exist in the same de- 
gree in all descriptions of country. They are particularly marked in a 
broken and wooded country, where the movements and position and 
strength of an enemy are only to be ascertained by feeling him, and espe- 
cially where there are no parallel roads by which the retreating army can 
be attacked in flank. The advantages alluded to make it wise, frequently, 
for a commander to fall back to a chosen ground when his adversary ad- 
vances ; and the battle of Perryville aff"ords an illustration of this principle. 
The rebel army was moving for concentration at some point which could 



46 

not be known to its adversary. A portion of it took advantage of the 
strong position at Perryville, commanding the only water within a distance 
of several miles, over which the Army of the Ohio must march to attack. 
That position afforded also the advantage of several lines of retreat. With 
these combined advantages, when it was discovered that a part of the 
rebel army was making a stand, it was as reasonable to expect to find its 
combined force wf lihe ana*uy there as at any other point, and dispositions 
had to be made accordingly. I believe that a sound and unprejudiced 
criticism will show that the movement of the Army of the Ohio was exe- 
cuted promptly and judiciously ; that it arrived more simultaneously and 
in better order than the enemy could have expected, considering that the 
point which he would choose for battle could not be foreseen ; and that but 
for the lack of timely information of the condition of things on the after- 
noon of the 8th, the main portion of the enemy's force at Perryville 
would have been captured. 

Contests between unequal forces result sometimes, but very rarely, from 
the fact that the inferior has no alternative but to fight or surrender. In by 
far the greatest number of cases, however, the conflict results from a lack 
of ability on the part of the inferior to avail himself of the means of ex- 
tricating his army ; or from a contempt for, or ignorance of, the strength of 
his adversary ; or from an advantage of position which, in his opinion, will 
outweigh that of superiority of numbers, and a corresponding ignorance 
of that advantage, or faulty dispositions on the part of the superior army ; 
and these last are the cases in which most frequently the inferior army is 
victorious. When the armies are about equal, they maneuver so as to 
deceive and cause each other to make detachments, or force each other to 
battle on ground unfavorable to the adversary. In all these cases the object 
is not merely to give battle for the sake of fighting, but to fight for victory, 
or at least safety, and with such advantages as will make success reasonably 
certain; and the more serious the consequences of defeat, the greater the 
caution to be observed. Ignorance a)id error multiply battles far more 
than valor, and generally with the penalty of disaster. If precaution and 
the observance of rule diminish the number of battles, and sometimes miss 
the accidental success which folly and recklessness might have gained, it is 
nevertheless true that in the end they usually triumph. 

The operations of the column under the command of General Gr. W. 
Moro-an at Cumberland Gap have been brought before the Commission. 
The deposition of Colonel DeCourcey, an officer under General Morgan's 
command, introduced as evidence for the Government, alleges that after 
General (Sldlt-Morgan commenced his advance upon Cumberland Gap in 
May last, he was suddenly arrested by a telegraphic dispatch Ironi 
me, ordering a retrograde movement, and slopping all further proceedings 
on the Tennessee side against the Gap. 



47 

General Morgan commenced his advance against Cumberland Gap in 
. pursuance of the orders which I gave him in March preceding, about the 
u A^^iStk of May. He had repeatedly represented that Jie was operating against 
a superior force of the enemy, and on the 8th oismi^ he telegraphed that 
the enemy had " over five thousand at Cumberland Gap, eight thousand 
at Big Creek Gap, with troops at Clinton and Knoxville. Should their 
force concentrate the enemy will outnumber us nearly three to one. What 
is General Negley doing?" Seeing no reason why I should expect him to 
advance by difficult mountains roads and defeat three to one of the enemy; 
and supposing that he may have regarded my orders for him to advance 
as more imperative than I meant them to be, without regard to the force 
opposed to him, I telegraphed him on the 9th as follows : "General Negley 
is fully employed in Tennessee and can give you no direct assistance. The 
force now in Tennessee is so small that no operations against East Ten- 
nessee can be attempted. You must, therefore, depend mainly on 
your own resources." And on the 10th I telegraphed him as follows: 
" Considering your force and that opposed to you, it will probably not be 
safe for you to undertake any extended operations. Other operations will 
soon have an influence on your designs, and it is, therefore, better for you 
to run no risk at present." 

These are the dispatches which caused the retrogi-ade movement referred 
to. I leave them to speak for themselves, in connection with the dispatches 
which elicited them. 

But, furthermore, on the same day, the lOtli, I received a dispatch from 
General Morgan, giving a rumor that the Gap was evacuated ; to which I 
replied the same day: "If Cumberland Gap is evacuated, you should 
" seize and hold it, and take any other advantage that may present itself, 
" but not advance to a point from which you would have to fall back." 

About this time General Mitchel, considering himself in danger from 
an anticipated advance upon him, was urging the necessity of a stronger 
force in Middle Tennessee, and I was about commencing my march from 
Corinth in that direction. 

Cumberland Gap was occupied on the 18th of June. General Morgan 
had about seven thousand five hundred men. His dispatches report the 
strength of the enemy opposed to him at not less than ten or twelve thou- 
sand ; and I have no reason to doubt that he reported correctly. At no 
time did he represent that he was able to hold P]ast Tennessee with the 
force he had, or the wish to attempt it, nor do I believe that he could 
have done it. It is true that on the 20th he telegraphed : " My telegraph 
" orders from Major-General Buell of the 10th instant do not permit me 
" to advance upon Knoxville, and I will not, until further instructions, 
"advance further than Tazewell; " and he also stated the preparation he 



48 

had made to destroy bridges, but had countermanded in consequence of 
that dispatch. He was answered on the 22d, four days after his arrival 
at the Gap, as follows : 

"It is impossible at present to send you any cavalry. The General has 
not intended his orders to prevent such expeditions for special purposes as 
you refer to in your dispatch of the 20th ; on the contrary, he approves 
them. His wish is for you to make yourself secure in the Gap and 
accomplish all the results you can by rapid expeditions; but not to 
attempt a deliberate advance on Knoxville, as long as it seems probable 
that you would not be able to maintain your position there. The General 
wishes to make no actual advance which he cannot maintain. It brings 
our friends among the people into trouble, and is injurious otherwise to 
our interests. James B. Fry, Chief of StaflF." 

I have no doubt that General Morgan acted wisely, and that he had not 
force enough to attack the enemy in force. He certainly was not re- 
strained from doing anything that duty and honor demanded. 

The policy which I observed toward the people of the territory 
occupied by my army has been vehemently and bitterly assailed by 
a portion of the press; but I believe that reason and justice will 
sustain it on every score, whether of expediency or humanity. In 
entering on my command, it was with an earnest willingness to 
devote my life to the object of restoring the Union, and I never 
doubted as to the course my duty required me to pursue. It was to 
defeat the rebels in arms whenever I could; and to respect the Con- 
stitution and laws, and the rights of the people under them, as far as was 
possible, consistently with a state of things which rendered military suc- 
cess a matter of primary importance for the restoration of the authority of 
the Government. This has been my rule of action from first to last. I 
did not undertake to punish men for opinion's sake, or even for past acts ; 
for Congress had prescribed the penalty for their offenses, and the mode 
of proceeding against them. Men in arms I treated as enemies; persons 
not in arms I treated as citizens of the United States; but I allowed no 
man to preach or act treason after the progress of my army had brought 
him again under the protection, as well as the authority, of the Govern- 
ment. 

I have, when necessary, given protection to the persons and property of 
peaceable citizens; and this I have done both to preserve the discipline of 
my troops, and out of respect for the just rights of the people under the 
laws of war, if not under the civil law. When the public interest Imtl^ 
required the use of private property for public purposes, I 4MMk so used 
it, allowing just compensation for it as far as practicable; and this I did 
not only on the ground of justice, but as a measure of military expediency ; 
for it enabled me to secure for my army necessaries, which otherwise 
would have been concealed or destroyed. 



49 

The bearing of tills question on the success of my military operations is 
something which I was bound to weigh well. It is recognized as one of 
great importance to the success of an invading army. Wars of invasion, 
always difficult, become tenfold so when the people of the invaded lerritory 
fcake an active part against the invading army. A system of plunder and 
outrage in such cases will produce the same effect of hatred and revenge 
that such treatment does under other circumstances among men; and the 
embarrassments resulting from them to the invading army become of the 
most serious nature. 

These considerations are of such importance to success, that there is no 
exception to the rule of securing the neutrality, if not the friendship, of 
the population as much as possible, by justaad kind treatment; and then — 
having given no good cause for hostility — to treat with kindness those who 
behave well, and with severity those who misbehave. 

Some months ago a statement appeared in the newspapers, on the reported 
authority of Governor Andrew Johnson, that I had only been prevented by 
his resolute expostulations from abandoning Nashville when I moved north 
with my army in September last. He has since made the same assertion 
in a deposition. Whenever I have spoken on this subject I have 
denounced the statement as false; and I now repeat that denunci- 
ation. I am very willing to bear the responsibility of my own acts or 
intentions; and it gives me sincere pleasure at all times to acknowledge any 
assistance I may receive from others either io counsel or action. If I had 
detei'mined to abandon Nashville it would have been upon my best judg" 
ment, and I should cheerfully have submitted to a verdict on the wisdom o 
my course. I assert that I never intimated to Governor Johnson an in- 
tention or wish to leave Nashville without a ganison; that there was no 
discussion between us pro and nju, on the subject, and that the determina- 
tion to hold the place was my own, uninfluenced by him in any manner. I 
had not that confidence in his judgment, or that distrust of my own which 
would have induced me to seek his counsel. On account of his officia I 
position I called on him first to inform him what I meant to do, and last to 
tell him what garrison I had concluded to leave. On both occasions, as far 
as my plans were concerned, 1 was the speaker and he the listener. My 
officers weie far more likely to know my views than he; and they have stated 
that I said always that the political importance of the occupation far out' 
weighed any purely military bearing of the question, and that I should hold 
the city. D- C. Buell, 

Major-General. 

Burnet Huuse, May 5, 1863. 



50 

KEPORT OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 

Headquarters Army op the Ohio, 1 
Fidd of Shiloh, April 15, 1862. j 
Captain N. H. McLean: 

Sir — The rear division of the army under «iy command, which had 
been dehiyed a considerable time in rebuilding the Duck river bridge, 
left Columl)ia on the 2d inst. I left the evening of that day, and arrived 
at Savanna on the evening of the 5th. General Nelson, with his division, 
which formed the advance, arrived the same day. The other divisions 
marched with intervals of about six miles. 

On the morning of the (ith the firing of cannon and musketry was heard 
in the direction of this place. Apprehending that a serioxis engagement 
had commenced, I went to General Grant's headquarters to get informa- 
tion as to the best means of reaching the battle-field with the division that 
had arrived. At the same time orders were dispatched to the divisions in 
rear to leave their trains and push forward by forced marches. I learned 
that General Grant had just started, leaving orders for General Nelson to 
march to the river opposite Pittsburg Landing, to be ferried across. An 
examination of the road* up the river discovered it to be impracticable for 
artillery, and General Nelson was directed to leave his to be carried for- 
ward by steamers. 

The impression existed at Savanna that the firing was only an aiFair of 
outposts, the same thing having occurred for the two or three previous 
days; but as it continued, I determined to go to the scene of action, and 
accordingly started with my Chief of Stafi", Colonel Fry, on a steamer 
which I had ordered to get under steam. As we proceeded up the river 
o-roups of soldiers were seen upon the west bank, and it soon became evi- 
dent that they were stragglers from the army that was engaged. The 
o-roups increased in size and frequency until, as we approached the land- 
ing they amounted to whole companies, and almost regiments; and at the 
landino' the bank swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regi- 
ments. The number could not have been less than four or five thousand, 
and later in the day it became much greater. Finding General Grant at 
the landing, I requested him to send steamers to Savanna to bring up 
General Crittenden's division, which had arrived during the morning, and 
then went ashore with him. The throng of disorganized and demoral- 
ized troops increased continually by fresh fugitives from the battle which 
steadily drew nearer the landing, and with these were mingled great num- 
bers of teams, all striving to get as near as possible to the river. With 
few exceptions, all efforts to form the troops and move them forward to 
the fight utterly failed. 

In the mean time the enemy had made such progress against our 



51 

troops that his artillery and musketry began to play into the vital spot 
of the position, and some persons were killed on the bank at the very 
landing. General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ainmen's brigade at 
this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack 
at that point, and with a battery of artillery which happened to be 
on the ground, and was brought into action, opened fire on the enemy 
and repulsed him. The action of the gunboats also contributed very 
much to that result. The attack at that point was not renewed, night 
having come on, and the firing ceased on both sides. In the mean time 
the remainder of General Nelson's division crossed, and General Critten- 
den's arrived from Savanna by steamers. After examining the ground as 
well as was possible at night in front of the line on which (jreneral Grant's 
troops had formed, and as fer to the right as General Sherman's division, 
I directed Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions to form in front of that 
line, and move forward as soon as it was light in the morning. During 
the night, and early the following morning. Captain Bartlett's Ohio Bat- 
tery, Captain Mendenhall's Regular Battery, and Captain Terrill's Bat- 
tery, Fifth Artillery, arrived. General McCook, by a forced march, 
arrived at Savanna during the night of the 6th, and reached the field of 
battle early in the morning of the 7th. I knew that the other divisions 
could not arrive in time for the action that day. 

The patch of country on which the battles of the 6th and 7th were 
fought is called Shiloh from the little church of that name, which stands 
in its midst. It consists of an undulating table land, elevated some eighty 
or one hundred feet above the river bottom. Along the Tennessee River 
te the east it breaks into abrupt ravines, and toward the south along Lick 
Creek, which empties into the Tennessee River some three miles above 
Pittsburg Landing, rises into a range of lulls of some hight, whose slopes 
are irraduai toward. Lick Creek. Owl Creek, rising near the source of 
Lick Creek, flows to the north-west around the battle field into Snake 
Creek, which empties into Tennessee River three miles below Lick Creek. 
The drainage is mainly from the Lick Creek ridge and the table land into 
Owl Creek. Coming from Corinth the principal road crosses Lick Creek 
at two points some twelve miles from its mouth and seperates into three or 
four principal branches which enter the table land from the south, at the 
distance of about a mile apart. Generally the face of the country is 
covered with woods through which troops can pass without great difiiculty, 
though occasionally the undergrowth is dense. Small f;irms or cultivated 
fields of from twenty to eighty acres occur now and then, but as a general 
thing the country is in forest. My entire ignorance of the various roads 
and of the character of the country at the time, rendered it impossible to 
anticipate the probable dispositions of the enemy, and the woods were 
always sufficient to screen his preparatory movements from observation. 



52 

Soon after five o'clock on the morning- of tbe 7tli, General Nelson's and' 
General Crittenden's Divisions, the only ones yet' arrived on the ground,, 
moved promptly forward to meet the enemy. Nelson's Division marching 
in line of battle, soon came upon his pickets, drove them in and at about 
six o'clock received the fire of his artillery. The division was here halted 
and Mendenhall's Battery brought into action to reply, while Crittenden's 
Division was being put into position on the right of Nelson's. Bartlett's. 
Battery was posted in the center of Crittenden's Division in a commanding 
position, opposite which the enemy was discovered to be formed in force. 
By this time McCook's Division arrived on the ground and was imme- 
diately formed on the right of Crittenden's ; skirmishers were thrown to 
the front and a strong body of them to guard our left flank, which though 
somewhat protected by rough ground, it was supposed the enemy might 
attempt to turn, and, in fact, did, but was handsomely repulsed with great 
loss. Eact brigade furnished its own reserve, and in addition Boyle's 
brigade, from Crittenden's division, though it formed at first in the line^, 
was kept somewhat back when the line advanced, to be used as occasion 
might require. I found on the ground parts of about two regiments,. 
perhaps one thousand men, and subsequently a similar fragment came up 
of General Grant's force. The first I directed to act with General 
McCook's attack, and the second was similarly employ«d on the left. I 
saw other straggling troops of General Grant's foi'ce immediately on 
General McCook's right, and some firing had already commenced there, 
I have no direct knowledge of the disposition of the remainder of General 
Grant's force, nor is it luy provence to speak of them. Those that came 
under my direction in the way I have stated rendered willing and efficient; 
service during the day. 

The force under my command occupied a line of about a mile and a half. 
In front of Nelson's division was an open field partially screened towards, 
his right by a skirt of woods, which extended through to the enemy's line, 
with a thick undergrowth in front of the left brigade of Crittenden's 
division ; then an open field in front of Crittenden's right and McCook's 
left; and in front of McCook's right, woods again with a dense under- 
growth. The ground, nearly level in front of Nelson, formed a hollow in 
front of Crittenden, and I'ell into a small creek or ravine which empties 
into Uwl Creek in front of McCook. What I afterwards learned was the 
Hamburg road, which crosses Lick Creek a mile from its mouth, passed 
perpendicularly through the line of battle near Nelson's left. On a line 
slightly oblique to us and beyond the open fields the enemy was formed 
with a battery in front of Nelson's left ; a battery commanding the woods 
iu front of Crittenden's left, and flanking the field in front of Nelson ; a 
battery commanding the same woods and the field in front of Crittenden's 



53 

right and MeCook's left; and a battery in front of MeCook's right. A 
short distance in rear of the enemy's left were the encaanpments of 
McClernand's and Sherman's divisions, which the enemy held. 

While my troops were getting into position, the fire was kept up be- 
tween Mendenhall's battery and the enemy's second battery, with some 
eflfect. Bartlett's battery was hardly in position before the enemy's third 
battery opened fire on that part of the line ; and when, very soon after, 
our line advanced with strong bodies of skirmishers in front, the action 
became general, and continued with severity during the greater part of the 
day, and until the enemy was driven from the field. The obliquity of dtil' 
line, the left being thrown forward, brought Nelson's division first into 
action, and it became very hotly engaged at an early hour. A charge of 
the Nineteenth brigade, from Nelson's right, led by its commander, Colonel 
Hazen, reached the enemy's second battery, but the brigade sustained a 
heavy loss by a cross fire of the enemy's batteries, and was unable to 
maintain its advantage against the heavy infantry force that came forward 
to oppose it. The enemy recovered the battery, and followed up his mo- 
mentary advantage by throwing a heavy force of infantry into the woods 
in front of Crittenden's left. The left brigade. Colonel W. 8. Smith, of 
that division, advanced into the woods, repulsed the enemy handsomely, 
and took several prisoners. In the meantime Captain Terrill's battery, 
Fifth artillery, which had just landed, reached the field, and was ordered 
into action near the left Avith Nelson's division, which was very heavily 
pressed by the greater numbers of the enemy. It belonged properly to 
MeCook's division. It took position near the Hambui'g road, in the open 
ground, in front of the enemy's right, and at once began to act with de- 
cided effect upon the tide of battle in that quarter. The enemy's right 
battery was silenced. Ammen's brigade, which was on the left, advanced 
in good order on the enemy's right, but was checked for some time by his 
endeavor to turn our left flank, and by his strong counter attack in front. 
Captain Terrill, who, in the meantime, had taken an advanced position, 
was compelled to retire, leaving one caisson, at which every horse was 
killed or disabled. It was very soon recovered. Having been reinforced 
by a regiment from General Boyle's brigade. Nelson's division again moved 
forward, and forced the enemy to abandon entii-ely his position. This 
success flanked the enemy's position at his second and third batteries, from 
which he was soon driven, with the loss of several pieces of artillery, by 
the concentrated fire of Terrills and Mendenhall's batteries and an attack 
from Crittenden's division in front. The enemy made a second stand 
some eight hundred yards in rear of this position, and opened fire 
with his artillery. Mendenhall's battery was thrown forward, silenced the 
battery, and it was captured by Crittenden's division, the enemy retreating 



54 

from it. In the meantime the division of General McCook, on the right, 
which became engaged somewhat later in the morning on the left, had 
made steady progress until it drove the enemy's left from the hotly-con- 
tested field. The action was commenced in this division by General Rous- 
seau's brigade, which di'ove the enemy in front of it from the first position 
and captured a battery. The line of attack of this position caused a con- 
siderable widening of the space between it and Crittenden's right. It was 
also out-flanked on its right by the line of the enemy, who made repeated 
strong attacks on its flanks, but was always gallantly repulsed. The 
enemy made his last stand in front of this division in the woods beyond 
Sherman's camp. 

Two brigades of General Wood's division arrived just at the close of the 
battle, but onl}'^ one of tliem, Colonel Wagner's, in time to participaie 
actively in tlie pursuit, which it continued for about a mile and until halted 
by my order. Its skirmishers became engaged for a few minutes with 
skirmishers covering the enemy's leai guard, which made a momentary 
stand. It was also fired upon by the enemy's artillery on its right flank, 
but without effect. It was well conducted by its commander, and showed 
great steadiness. 

The pursuit was continued no further that day. I was without cavalry, 
and tlie difterent corps had become a good deal scattered on a pursuit over 
a country which screened the movements of the enemy, and the roads of 
which I knew practically nothing. In the beginning of the pursuit, think- 
ing it pi'obable the enemy had retired partly by the Hamburg road, I had 
ordered Nelson's division forward as far as Lick Creek on that road, from 
which I afterward learned the direct Corinth road was separated by a difficult 
ravine which empties into Lick Creek. I therefore occupied myself with 
examining the ground and getting the different divisions into position, which 
was not effected until some time after dark. 

The following morning, in pursuance of tlie diiections of General Grant. 
General Wood was sent forward with two of his brigades and a battery of 
artillery to discover the position of the enemy and press him, if he should 
be found in retreat. General Sherman with about the same force from 
General Grant's jirrcy was on the same service, and had a spirited skirmish 
with the enemy's cavalry, driving it back. The main force was found to 
have retreated beyond Lick Creek, and our troops returned at night. 

There were no idlers in the battle of tlie 7th. Every portion of the army did 
its work. The batteries of Captains Terrill and Mendenhall were splendidly 
handled and served; that of Captain Bartlett was served with great spirit 
and gallantly, though with less decisive results. I especially commend to 
the favor of the Government for distinguislied gallantry and good conduct- 
Brigadier-General A. McD. McCook, commanding Second Division; Briga- 



55 

dier-General Wm. Nelson, commanding Fourth Division; Brigadier-General 
Thomas L. Crittenden, commanding Fifth Division; Brigadier-General 
Lovell H. Rousseau, commanding Fourth Brigade ; Brigadier-General 
J. T. Boyle, commanding the Sixteenth Brigade ; Colonel J. Ammen, 
Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, commanding Tenth Brigade; Colonel W 
S. Smith, Thii'teenth Ohio Volunteers, commanding Fourteenth Brigade: 
Colonel E. N. Kirk, Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers, commanding Fifth 
Brigade; Colonel W. H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, temporarily 
commanding Sixth Brigade; Captain W. A. Terrill, Fifth Artillery; Captain 
John Mendenhall, Fourth Artillery; Captain Bartlett, Ohio Volunteer Bat- 
tery. For the many other officers who won honorable distinction, I refer 
to the reports of the division, brigade and regimental commanders trans- 
mitted herewith; as also for more detailed information of the services of the 
different corps. I join cordially in the commendation bestowed by these 
officers on those under their command. 

The loss of the force under my command is 263 killed, 1,816 wounded, 
and 88 missing. Total, 2,167. The trophies are twenty pieces of artillery, 
a greater number of caissons, and a considerable number of small arms. 
Many of the cannon were recaptured from the loss of the previous day. 
Several stands of colors were also recaptured. 

The members of my Staff, Colonel James B. Fry, Chief of Staff; Cap- 
tain J. M. Wright, Assistant Adjutant General; Lieutenant C. L. Fitz- 
hugh, Fourth Artillery, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant A. F. Rockwell, New 
York Chasseurs, Aid-de-camp; Lieutenant T. J. Bush, Twenty-fourth 
Kentucky, Aid-de-camp; Captain J. H. Gilman, Nineteenth Infantry, In- 
spector of Artillery; Captain E. Gay, Sixteenth Infiintry, Inspector of 
Cavalry; Captain H. C. Bankhead, Fifth Infantry, Inspector of Infantry; 
Captain Nathaniel Michler, Topographical Engineers; were distinguished 
for their gallant bearing throughout the battle, and rendered valuable ser- 
vice. The gallant deportment of my orderlies. Privates A. J. William- 
son, Fourth Cavalry, and N. M. Smith, J. R. Hewitt, J. A. Stevenson, V. 
B. Hammell, of the xVnderson Troop, also deserves to be mentioned. I 
am particulafly indebted to Colonel Fry, Chief of Staff, for valuable as- 
sistance in the battle, as, well as for the ability and industry with which he 
has at all times performed the important duties of his position. Surgeon 
Murray, Medical Director, always assiduous in the discharge of his duties, 
was actively engaged on the field, in taking the best care of the wounded that 
the circumstances admitted of. Captain Gillem, Assistant Quartermaster, 
is entitled to great credit for his energy and industry in providing trans- 
portation for the troops from Savanna. Lieutenant Colonel James Oaks, 
Fourth Cavalry, Inspector of Cavalry, and Captain C. C. Gilbert, First 
Infantry, Acting Inspector General, who have rendered zealous and val- 



56 

uable service in their positions, were detained at Savanna and unable to be 
present in the action. 

The troops which did not arrive in time for the battle, General Thomas' 
and part of Greneral Wood's divisions, (a portion of the latter, as I have 
previously stated, took part in the pursuit and the remainder arrived in the 
evening,) are entitled to the hiuhest praise for the untiring eneagy with 
which they pressed forward night and day, to share the dangers of their 
comrades. One of these divisions, General Thomas', had already, under 
his command, made its name honorable by one of the most memorable vic- 
tories of the war, "Mill Spring," on which the tide of success seemed to 
turn steadily in favor of the Union. 

(Signed) D. C. Buell, Major General Commanding. 



OFFICIAL EEPOET OF THE BATTLE OF PEEBYVILLE. 

Louisville, November 4, 1862. 
Genrral L. ThoinaA^ Adjutan General U. S. A., Washington, D. C: 

Sir — It is due to the army which I have commanded for the last 
twelve months, and perhaps due to myself, that I should make a circum- 
stantial report of its operations during the past summer. Such a report 
requires data not now at hand, and would occupy more time than can be 
spared at present from the subject of more immediate interest, namely, 
the operations from Louisville against the rebel forces in Kentucky under 
the command of General Bragg. I therefore commence this report from 
that period, premising only in a general way, that my attention to the con- 
dition of aiiairs in Kentucky was demanded first by the minor operations 
of the enemy, which, by the destruction of the railroad, had completely 
severed the communications of my army, and left it at a distance of three 
hundred miles from its base with very limited supplies; and second by the 
formidable invasion which not only threatened the permanent occupation 
of the state, but exposed the states north of the Ohio river to invasion. 

Leaving a sufficient force to hold Nashville, the remainder of the army, 
under my command was put in march for Kentucky. The rear division 
left Nashville on the 15th, and arrived at Louisville, a distance of one 
hundred and seventy miles, on the 29th of September. The advance 
arrived on the 25th. The particulars of the march will, as I have said, 
be given in a subsequent report in connection with other matters. I 
found in and about the city a considerable force of raw troops hurriedly 
thrown in from Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, for the defense of the city 
against the formidable force that had invaded the state under Generals 
Bragg and Kirby Smith. Under the command of 3Iajor General Nelson, 



57 

"wliose untimely death can not be too niucli deplored; these troops had 
been organized into brigades and divisions, and they had some able and 
experienced officers in Generals Boyle, Jackson, Crufts, Grilbert, Terrill 
and others; but the troops were as yet undisciplined, unprovided with a 
suitable artillery, and in every way unfit for active operations against a 
disciplined foe. It was necessary to reorganize the whole force. This 
was done, as far as possible, by intermixing the new troops with the old, 
without changing the old organization. The troops were supplied with 
shoes and other essentials, of which they were greatly in need, among 
them certain light cooking utensils, which the men could carry and dis- 
pense with wagons, the allowance of which was reduced to one for each 
regiment to carry a few necessary articles for officers, and one for hospital 
supplies, besides the ambulances. The army was to have marched on the 
30th of September, but an order, which was subsequently suspended, 
relieving me from the command, delayed the movement till the following 
day. The army marched on the 1st ultimo in five columns. The left 
moved toward Frankfort to hold in cheek the force of the enemy which 
still remained at or near that place. The other columns marching by dif- 
ferent routes, finally fell respectively into the roads leading from Sliep- 
herdsville, Mt. Washington, Fairfield and Bloomfield to Bardstown, where 
the main force of the enemy under General Bragg was known to be. 
These roads converge upon Bardstown at an angle of about fifteen degrees 
from each other. 

Skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry and artillery marked the move- 
ment of each column from within a few miles of Louisville. It was more 
stubborn and formidable near Bardstown ; but the rear of the enemy's 
infantry retired from that place eight hours before our arrival, when his 
rear guard of cavalry and artillery retreated, after a sharp engagement 
with my cavalry. The pursuit and skirmishing with the enemy's rear 
guard continued towards Springfield. 

The information which I received indicated that the enemy would con- 
centrate his forces at Danville. The first corps, under Major General Mc- 
Cook, was therefore ordered to march from Bloomfield on Harrrodsburg, 
while the second corps, under Major General Crittenden, moved on the 
Lebanon road, which passes four miles to the south of Perryville, with a 
branch to the latter place ; and the third corps on the direct road to Per- 
ryville. My headquarters accompanied the third, or center corps; Major 
General Thomas, second in command, accompanied the right or second 
corps. After leaving Bardstown, I learned that the force of Kirby Smith had 
crossed to the west side of the Kentucky river, near Salvisa, and that the en- 
emy was moving to concentrate either at Harrodsburg or Perryville. Gen. 
McCook's route was therefore changed from Harrodsburg to Perryville. 
8 



58 

The center corps arrived on the afternoon of the 7th, and was drawn np 
in order of battle about three miles from Perryville, where the enemy ap- 
peared to be in force. The adTaiiced guard, under Captain Gay, consist- 
in"- of cavalry and artillery, supported towards evening by two regiments 
of infantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy's rear guard to withira 
two miles of the town, against a somewhat stubborn opposition. 

The whole army had for three days or more suffered from a scarcity of 
water. The last day^ particularly, the troops and animals suffered exceed- 
ino-ly for want of it, and from hot weather and dusty roads. In the bed 
of Doctor's Creek, a tributary of Chaplin Kiver, about two and a half 
miles from Perryville, some pools of water were discovered, which the 
enemy showed a determination to prevent us from gaining possession of_ 
The thirty-sixth brigade, under the command of Colonel Daniel McCook, 
from Sheridan's division, was ordered forward to seize and hold a com- 
manding position which covered these pools. It executed the order that 
night, and a supply of bad water was secured for the troops. 

On discovering that the enemy was concentrating for battle at Perryville, 
I sent orderSj on the night of the 7th, to General McCook and General 
Crittenden to march at three o'clock the following morning, so as to take 
position respectively, as early as possible on the right and left of the cen- 
ter corps ; the commanders themselves to report in person for orders, on 
their arrival, my intention being to make the attack that day if possible. 
The orders did not reach General McCook until two and a half o'clock, 
and he marched at five. The second corps failing to find water where it 
was expected to encamp the night of the 7th, had to move off the road for 
that purpose, and consequently was some six miles or more further off than 
it would otherwise have been. The orders did not reach it in time, and 
these two causes delayed its arrival several hours. Still it was far enough 
advanced to have been pressed into the action of the 8th, if the necessity 
for it had been known early enough. 

The engagement which terminated at night the previous day, was 
renewed early on the morning of the 8th, by an attempt of the enemy to 
drive the bri"-ade of Colonel McCook from the position taken to cover the 
water in Doctors Creek. The design had been discovered, and the 
divisions of Generals jNIitchell and Sheridan were moved into position to 
defeat it and hold the ground until the army was prepared to attack in 
force. A spirited attack was made on Colonel McCook's position, and was 
handsomely repulsed. Between ten and eleven o'clock the left corps 
arrived on the Maxvillc road. General McCook was instructed to get it 
promptly into position on the left of the center corps, and to make a 
reconnoissanee to his front and left. The reconnoissance had been con- 
tinued by Captain Gay toward his front and right, and sharp firing with 



59 

aTtillery was then going ob. I liad somewhat expected am attack early in 
the morning ou (Gilbert's corps, while it was isolated, but as it did not 
take place, no formidable attack was apprehended after the arrival of the 
left corps. The dispositioa of the troops was made mainly with a view to 
a combined attack on the enemy's position at daylight the following 
morning, as the time reqtiired to get all the troops into position after the 
unexpected deloy would probably make it too late to attack that day. 

The cannonading which commenced with the partial engagement in the 
center, followed by the reconnoissance of the cavalry under Captain Gay, 
extended toward the left and became brisker as the day advanced, but was 
not supposed to proceed from any serious engagement a.s no report to that 
effect was received. At four o'clock, however. Major General McCook's 
aid-de-camp arrived and reported to me that the General was sustaining a 
severe attack, which he would not be able to withstand unless reinforced — 
that his flanks were already giving way. He added, to my astonishment, 
that the left corps had actually been engaged in a severe battle for several 
hours — perhaps since twelve o'clock. It was so difficult to credit the 
latter that I thought there must even be some inisappiehension in regard 
to the former, I sent word to him that I should rely on his being able to 
hold his ground, though I should probably send him reinforcements. I 
at once sent orders for two brigades from the center corps, (Schoepff's 
division,) to move promptly to reinforce the left. Orders were also sent 
to General Crittenden to move a division in to strengthen the center, and 
to move with the rest of his corps energetically against the enemy's left 
flank. The distance from one flank of the army to the other was not, 
perhaps, less than six miles, and before the orders could be delivered and 
the right corps make the attack, night came on and terminated the 
enoaf;:ement. 

The roads going from Maxville and Springfield enter Perryville at an 
angle of about fifteen degrees with each other. The road from Leba- 
non runs nearly parallel to the Springfield road to within five miles of Per- 
ryville, and there forks — the left hand fork going to Perryville, and the 
right continuing straight on to Danville, leaving Perryville four miles to the 
north. There is also a direct road from Perryville to Danville. Perryville, 
Danville and Harrodsburg occupy the vertices of an equilateral triangle, 
and are ten miles apart. Salt River rises midway between Perryville 
and Danville, and runs northward two miles west of Harrodsburg. Chaplin 
Fork rises near and passes through Perryville, bending in its coui'se so as 
to run obliquely away from the Maxville and Perryville road, on which the 
left corps advanced. Doctor's Creek running north crosses the Perryville 
and Springfield road at right angles about two and a half miles west of 
Perryville, and empties into Chaplin Fork about three miles from town. 



60 

The ground bordering the Chaplin is hilly, with alternate patches of timber 
and cleared land. The hills, though in some places steep, are generally 
practicable for infantry and cavalry, and in many places for artillery. The 
ground aftbrded the enemy great advantages for attacking a force on the 
Maxville road, taken in the act of forming, as was the case in the battle of 
the 8th. General McCook's line ran nearly parallel with Chaplin Fork, the 
right resting on the road and the left to the north of it. Two of General 
Rousseau's brigades, the Seventeenth under Colonel Lytle, and the Fourth 
under Colonel Harris, were on the right; then the Thirly-third Brigade 
under General Terrill, of Jackson's Division; then on the extreme left and 
to the rear of Terrill the Twenty-eighth Brigade, under Colonel Stark- 
weather, of Rousseau's Division. The other britrade of Jackson's Division, 
under Colonel Webster, was at tirst in rear of Rousseau's two right bri- 
gades, and in the course of the battle was brought into action on the right. 
General Gilbert's corps was on the right of Rousseau, but the space between 
them was somewhat too great — lirst Sheridan's Division, then Mitchell's, 
and Schoepf's in reserve, opposite the left of the corps. 

The fight commenced early in the day, as has been described, with a 
feeble attack on the center corps ; then later the attack fell with severity 
and pertinacity on Rousseau's right brigades; then somewhat later on Ter- 
rill's brigade and on Rousseau's third brigade, on the extreme left. It 
was successful againt Terrill's brigade, composed of new regiments. 
The gallant commander of the division. General J. S. Jackson, was 
killed almost instantly. The heroic 3'oung Brigadier, Terrill, lost his life 
in endeavoring to rally his troops, and ten pieces of artillery were 
left on the ground. Two of them were carried off by the enemy the 
next morning ; the rest were recovered. The main weight of the 
battle thus fell upon the Third division, under General Rousseau. 
No troops could have met it with more heroism. The left brigade, com- 
pelled at first to fall back somewhat, at length maintained its ground and 
repulsed the attack at that point. Taking advantage of the opening be- 
tween Gilbert's left and Rousseau's right, the enemy pressed his attack at 
that point with an overwhelming force. Rousseau's right \vas being- 
turned, and was forced to fall back, which it did in excellent order, until re- 
inforced by Gooding's and Steadnian's brigades, from (Gilbert's corps, wheu 
the enemy was repulsed. That result was also promoted by the fire which 
the artillery of Sheridan's division poured into the left enemy's flank. 
Simultaneously with the heaviest attack on Rousseau's division, the enemy 
made a strong attack on Sheridan's right. Sheridan was reinforced from 
Mitchel's division, by Colonel Carlin's brigade, which charged the enemy 
with intrepidity, and drove him through the town to his position beyond, 
capturing, in the town, two caissons and fii'teen wagons loaded with am- 



61 

munition, and the gaiard that was with them, consisting of three officers 
and one hundred and thirty-eight men. This occurred about nightfall, 
which terminated the battle. The corps of General Crittenden cloj-ed in, 
and Wagner's brigade, of Wood's division, became engaged, and did good 
service on the right of Mitchel's division ; but, knowing nothing of the 
severity of the fight on the extreme left, the rest of the corps did not get 
into action. 

No doubt was entertained that the enemy would endeavor to hold his 
position. Accordingly, orders were sent to the commanders of corps to 
be prepared to attack at daylight in the morning. They received instruc- 
tions in person at my headc^uarters that night, except General Crittenden, 
for whom instructions were given to Major General Thomas, second in 
command. General McCook supposed from indications in his front that 
the enemy would throw a formidable force against his corps, in pursuance 
of the original attempt to turn our left. He represented, also, that his 
corps was very much crippled, the new dsvision of General Jackson hav- 
ing in fact almost entirely disappeared as a body. He was instructed to 
move in dviring the night and close the opening between his right and 
General Gibert's left. His orders for the following day were to hold his 
position, taking advantage of any opportunity that the events of the day 
might present. The corps of Generals Crittenden and Gilbert were to 
move forward at six o'clock and attack the enemy's front and left flank. 
The advance the following morning, in pursuance of these orders discov- 
ered that the enemy's main body had retired during the night, but with- 
out any indications of haste or disorder, except that his dead and wounded 
were left upon the field. The reconnoissance during the day showed that 
his whole force had fallen back on Harridsburg, where the indications 
seemed to be that he would make a stand. 

It will be impossible to form any correct judgment of the operations 
from this time particularly, without considering the condition of the two 
armies, and the probable intentions of tho enemy. The rebel army has 
been driven from the borders of Kentucky without a decisive battle. It 
is spoken of as if it were a comparatively insignificant force pursued by 
an overwhelming one, which had nothing to do but send oiit patrols and 
gather in the fragments of a routed and disorganized army. The very 
reverse was the case. The rebel force which invaded Kentucky, at the 
lowest estimates, has been rated at from fifty-five to sixty-five thousand 
men. It was composed of veteran troops, well armed and thoroughly 
inured to hardship. Every circumstance of its march, and the concurrent 
testimony of all who came within reach of its lines, attest that it was under 
perfect discipline. It had entered Kentucky with the avowed purpose of 
holding the state. Its commanders declared that to be their intention to 



62 

the last; Intercepted communications disclosing their plans, and the disap- 
pointment expressed by the Southern press at the result, show that to 
have been their purpose. The enterprise certainly seemed desperate, but it 
was entered upon deliberately, was conducted by the best talent in the rebel 
service, and there was nothing to indicate that it would be abandoned 
lightly. Some maneuvering for advantage, and one decisive battle were 
to be expected before Kentucky could be rid of her indvader. Every- 
thing goes to show that the final retreat of the enemy was suddenly de- 
termined on, and that it was not at the time to be calculated iipon as a 
matter of course. Any movements on my part solely in anticipation of it 
would only have turned the enemy in a difierent direction, and any pre- 
sumptuous attempt to capture a superior force by detachments would, ac- 
c ording to all probabilities, have been more likely to result in defeat than 
in success. 

The effective force which advanced on Perry ville on the 7th and Uh, 
under my command, was about fifty-eight thousand infantry, artillery and 
cavalry. Of these about twenty-two thousand were raw troops, with very 
little instruction or none at ali. The reports show an actual loss of upward 
of iour thousand killed, wounded and missing in the battle, which woxild 
leave the effective force about fifty-four thousand after it. I did not hesi- 
tate, therefore, after crossing Chaplin River and finding the enemy had 
fallen back, to await the arrival of General Sill's division, which had marched 
to Frankfort and had been ordered to join via Lawrenceburg and Chaplin- 
town, when it was ascertained that Kirby Smith's force had marched to form 
a junction with Bragg. That division on the march from Louisville 
encountered a strong outpost of the enemy on the Frankfort road, about 
twelve miles out, and skirmishing was kept up until its arrival at Frank- 
fort. It was followed closely by General Dumont's division, which remained 
at Frankfort. In marching from Frankfort to join the main body Sill's 
division was attacked near Lawrenceburg by a portion of Kirby Smith's 
force, which it drove off", and then continued its march, arriving at Perry- 
ville on the evening of the 1 1th. Pending its arrival the army took position 
with its right four miles from Danville, its center on the Perryville and 
Harrodsburg pike, and the left near Dicksville, on roads converging on 
Harrodsburg. On the 11 th three brigades from Crittenden's and Gilbert's 
corps, with Gay's and McCook's cavalry brigades, were sent out to recon- 
noiter the enemy's position. He was found in force two miles south of 
Harrodsburg, in the morning, but retired during the day, and his rear 
iruard was driven out in the evenin"- with the loss of some stores and about 
twelve hundred prisoners, mostly sick and wounded. It was probable he 
would retire his whole force to Camp Dick Robinson, though it was not 
certainly ascertained what portion of it had crossed Dick's River. To 



63 

compel him to take at once one side or the other, and either give battle on 
this side or be prevented from recrossing to attack our communications 
when a move was made to turn his position, the left corps moved on the 
12lh to Harrodsburg, (General Sill's division having arrived the night 
before;) the right corps moving forward and resting near and to the left of 
Danville, and the center midway on the Danville and Harrodsburg road; 
while a reconnoissance was sent forward to the crossing of Dick's River. 
The enemy was found to have crossed with his whole force. 

The ground between the Kentucky River and Dicks River, as a military 
position, is rendered almost impregnable on the north and west by the 
rocky cliffs which border those streams, and which are only passable at a 
few points easily defended. Such is the character of Dicks River from its 
mouth to where the Danville and Lexington road crosses it, a distance of 
about twelve miles. It could only be reached by turning it to the south, 
while the passes to the west by which our line of communications would 
be exposed, were suitably guarded. The army was moving with that view 
when I learned, on the evening of the 13th, at Danville, that the enemy 
was retiring from his position towards the south. Pursuit was immedi- 
ately ordered for the purpose of overtaking him, or intercepting him if 
he should attempt to pass towards Somerset. Greneral Wood's division 
marched at twelve o'clock that night, and engaged the enemy's cavalry 
and artillery at Stanford at daylight the next morning. The remainder of 
General Crittenden's corps, and General McCook's corps followed on that 
road, and General Gilbert marched on the Lancaster road. The enemy 
kept the road towards Cunberland Gap, opposing with cavalry and artil- 
lery the advance of both of the pursuing columns, which, however, pro- 
gressed steadily. 

At Crab Orchard, the character of the country suddenly changes. It 
becomes rough and barren, affording scarcely more than enough corn for 
its sparse population; and the road passes through defiles where a small 
force can resist with great effect a large one — where, in fact, the use of a 
large force is impracticable. The little forage the country afforded was 
consumed by the enemy in his retreat, rendering it impossible to stibsist 
any considerable number of animals. The corps of General McCook and 
General Gilbert were therefore halted at Crab Orchard, while that of Gen- 
eral Crittenden, with General W. S. Smith's division in advance, continued 
the pursuit as far as London on the direct road, and on the branch road to 
Manchester. I have not yet received the formal report of the operations 
of this corps; but the pursuit was conducted by its commander according 
to my orders with judgment and energy. The road was cleared of the 
trees felled across it by the enemy, and his rear guard attacked success- 
fully at several points. Some prisoners were taken, and about three hun- 
ilvf^tl head of cattle, and other property to no very great amount captured. 



64 

It was not expedient to continue the pursuit beyond London — partly 
because it was impracticable in a manner to aiFord any material advantage ; 
partly because without advantage it took the troops out of the way, when 
they were likely to be required elsewhere. They were therefore promptly 
turned upon other routes towards Tennessee. A portion were to be at 
Bowling Green and the rest at (llasgow, on the 31st ultimo, and thence 
continue their march by certain routes. In that position I relinquished 
the command of the army on the oOtli to !Major General Rosecrans, in 
obedience to instructions from the General-in-Chief In the meantime the 
railroads which had been broken up by the enemy and suspended for two 
months, had been repaired as far as Bowling Green, to carry forward sup- 
plies. 

I have no means at this time of reporting the easualities that occurred 
in the minor engagements or skil'mishes that took place during the cam- 
paign, nor is it possible for me to do justice to the services of the officers 
and soldiers engaged in them, as the subsequent movements of the troops 
and my separation from them have prevented me from obtaining detailed 
reports except concerning the battle of the 8th. The particulars referred 
to outside of the battle, are based upon the brief and sometimes oral 
reports made at the time, and are unavoida'bly less complete and definite 
than I could wish. For the same reason many such I am unable to 
mention at all. In regard to the battle of the 8th, the repoi'ts of the 
several commanders go much more into detail than is necessary in this 
report, and I beg leave to commend them to your consideration, especially 
in relation to the services of many officers whose names are not herein 
mentioned. AVhen I have mentioned troops by the name of their com- 
mander, I wish to be understood as commending him for their good 
conduct. 

The daily services of officers in an active campaign, though less brilliant 
are often more arduous and important than those of the battle-field; and 
in this respect also the commanders of corps, Major General McCook, 
Major General Crittenden, and Brigadier General Gilbert are entitled to 
my thanks and the approbation of the Government. This commendation 
should extend also to many other officers in proportion to their responsi- 
bilities, particularly to the commanders of divisions. I am indebted in the 
highest degree to the members of my staff for their assistance, especially 
to my chief of staff, Colonel James B. Fry, whose efficient aid I have had 
during the whole period of my command in Kentucky and Tennessee. 
The difficult and responsible duty of supplying a large force by wagon 
transportation over a line of almost one hundred and forty miles, has been 
zealously and ably performed by Captain J. G. Chandler, Chief Quarter- 
termaster, and Captain Francis Darr, Chief Commissary. Captain H. C. 



65 

Bankliead, Acting Inspector Greneral, Captain J. H. Gilmaii, Chief of Ar- 
tillery, and acting ordnance officer, and Captain M. Mickler, Topograph- 
ical Engineers, discharged their duties in the most satisfiictory manner. 
At Perryville they were active and useful in reconnoitering the ground 
with a view to posting troops for battle. Major J. M. AVright, Assistant 
Adjutant General, Lieutenant T. J. Bush, Aid-de-camp, conveyed my 
orders to different commanders during the Sth, and at all times performed 
their duties with intelligence and zeal. The duties of his office have been 
ably and faithfully performed by Surgeon Ro})ert jMurray, Medical Di- 
rector. The inteltigent officers of the Signal Corps, Captain Jesse Merrill, 
and Lieutenants Meeker, Sheridan and Fitch, attached to my headquarters, 
rendered good service at Perryville and other points. Private Oakford, of 
the Anderson Troop, in carrying orders late on the evening of the Sth, 
fell into the enemy's lines and was captured, but had the presence of mind 
to destroy his dispatches. 

I can not omit to make honorable mention of the Michigan regiment 
of Mechanics and Engineers. It has not only rendered invaluable 
ervice in its appropriate duties dui'ing the past year, but at Chaplin 
Hills and on other occasions it has in whole or in part gallantly engaged 
the enemy. I especially commend Colonel Innis, Lieutenant Colonel 
Hunton, and Major Hopkins for the efficient services of this fine regiment. 
The cavalry under Colonel John Kennett, Fourth Ohio, commanding a 
division, Colonel Lewis Zahm, Third Ohio, commanding a brigade. Colonel 
E. L. McCook, Second Indiana, commanding a brigade, and Captain E. Gay, 
commanding a brigade, rendered excellent service. The brigade of Captain 
Gay was conducted with gallantry and effect by that officer at Perryville on 
the 7th and Sth. The other brigades were not in the battle, but came in 
contact with the enemy on other occasions during the campaign. When the 
army marched on Louisville they were left on the south side of Salt River, 
under the command of Colonel Kennett, to escort the train of the army from 
Bowling Green, and watch the enemy in the direction of Bardstown. The 
train was conducted in the most successful manner by Colonel Zahm, 
The brigade of Colonel E. L. McCook also acquitted itself in the most 
satisfactory manner. A portion of it, under Lieutenant 11. B. Stewart, 
Second Indiana Cavalry, captured Colonel Crawford and the principal part 
of his regiment of Georgia cavalry, near New Haven, on the 29th of 
September. Colonel Kennett, with Colonel McCook's brigade, rejoined 
the army at Bardstown on the 5th. Colonel Zahm marched across from 
the mouth of Salt River to join the column at Frankfort, thence to the 
main body at Danville. 

The campaign whose history I have sketched occupied a period of about 
twenty days. The result can be stated in a few words. An army pre- 




66 

pared for the conquest and occupation of Kentucky, with full knowledge 
of our means of resistance, and with a confident expectation of prevailing 
over them, has been driven back, bafiled and dispiriL from the borders of 
the state. It is true that only one serious battle^has been fought, and 
that was incomplete and less decisive than it might have been. That it 
was so, is due partly to unavoidable difficulties which prevented the troops, 
marching on different roads, from getting upon the ground simultaneously, 
but more to the fact that I was not apprised early enough of the condition 
of affairs on my left. I can find no foult with the former, nor am I dis- 
posed at this time to censure the latter, though it must be admitted to have 
been a grave error. I ascribe it to the too great confidence of the General 
commanding the left corps (Major-General MeCook), which made him 
believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of 
his commander. As before stated, there was skirmishing along the whole 
front, but after a certain hour, for the reason stated, no general engage- 
ment was anticipated that day, and no sound of musketry reached my 
headquarters by which the sharpness of the action on the left could be 
known or even suspected ; and when the fict was ascertained it was too 
late to do more than throw in succor before night set in. But although 
this lack of information was attended with disappointment and unfortunate 
circumstances, yet the unequal struggle was marked by no disaster, and 
conspicuously displayed the courage and discipline of the troops. 

From first to last, I suppose four or five thousand prisoners, sick, 
wounded and well, were taken ; and at various points some stores and prop- 
erty f^ll into our hands, among them twenty-five hundred barrels of pork 
and two pieces of cannon abandoned at Camp Dick Robinson. I do not 
believe that the enemy carried off in his retreat any large amount of 
stores; he may have sent ofl' a good deal from first to last, while he was 
in quiet occupation of so much of the state. 

The reports show a loss of 016 killed, 2,943 wounded and 489 missing. 
Total, 4,H48 in the battle of the 8th. It includes many valuable lives. 
The loss of such men as James S. Jackson, Wm. R. Terrill, George P. 
Jouett, George Webster, W. P. Campbell, Alexander D. Berryhill, and 
John Harrell, would be mourned in any army and any cause where true 
manliness and earnest devotion are appreciated. 

I inclose herewith the reports of subordinate commanders as far as 
received, and a map showing the lines of ojieration of the army. 

Major-Ceneral Thomas acted as second in command during the campaign, 
and I am indebted to him for the most valuable assistance. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

D. C. BuELL, Major-General Commanding. 



67 

Headquarters Department op the Ohio, } 

Louisville^ Ki/.y December 27, 18G1. | 
General Orders^ No. 23.] 

The General commandiug takes pleasure in bringing to notice the gal- 
lant conduct of a portion of Colonel Willich's regiment, Thirty-second 
Indiana, at Eowlett's Station, in front of Munfordsville, on the 17th 
instant. 

Four companies of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, 
on outpost duty, were attacked by a column of the enemy, consisting of 
one regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery and two regiments of 
infantry. They defended themselves until reinforced by other companies 
of the regiment, and the fight was continued with such effect that the 
enemy at length retreated precipitately. 

The attack of the enemy was mainly with his cavalry and artillery. 
Our troops fought as skirmishers, rallying rapidly into squares when 
charged by the cavalry — sometimes even defending themselves singly, and 
killing their assailants with the bayonet. 

The General tenders his thanks to the officers and soldiers of the regi- 
ment for their gallant and efficient conduct on this occasion. He com- 
mends it as a study and example to all other troops under his command, 
and enjoins them to emulate the discipline and instruction which insure 
such results. 

The name of " Eowlett's Station " will be inscribed on the regimental 
colors of the Thirty-second Indiana regiment. 

By command of Brigadier-General Buell. 

James B. Fry, A. A. G., Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Department of the Ohk), 
Louisville^ Kentvckij. January 20, lfttI2. 

General Orders, No. la.] 

The General Commanding takes occasion to thank Colonel Garfield and 
his troops for their successful campaign against the rebel force under 
General Marshall on the Big Sandy, and their gallant conduct in battle. 
They have overcome formida1)le difficulties in the character of the country, 
the condition of the roads, and the inclemency of the season ; and, without 
artillery, have in several engagements, terminating with the battle on 
Middle Creek on the 11th inst., driven the enemy from his entrenched 
positions, and forced him back into the mountains with the loss of a large 
amount of baggage and stores, and many of his men killed or captured. 

These services have called into action the highest (jualities of a soldier — 
fortitude, perseverance, courage. 

By command of General Buell. 

James B. Fry, A. A. G., Chief of Staff. 



68 

Headquarters Department of the Ohio, ] 
Louisville., Kentucky., January 23, 1862. | 
General Orders, No. 4b.] 

The General Commanding lias the gratification of announcing the 
achievement of an important victory, on the 19th inst., at Mill Spring, by 
the troops under General Thomas, over the rebel forces, some twelve 
thousand strong, under General George B. Crittenden and General 
Zollicolfer. 

The defeat of the enemy was thorough and complete, and his loss in 
killed and wounded was great. Night alone, under cover of which his 
troops crossed the river from their intrenched camp and dispersed, pre- 
vented the capture of his entire force. Fourteen or more pieces of artillery, 
some fifteen hundred horses and mules, his entire camp equipage, together 
with wagons, arms, ammunition, and other stores to a large amount, fell 
into our hands. 

The General has been charged by the General-in-Chief to convey his 
thanks to General Thomas and his troops for their brilliant victory. No 
task could be more grateful to him, seconded as it is by his own cordial 
approbation of their conduct. 

By command of Brigadier-General Buell. 

James B. Fry, A. A. G., Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Department op the Ohio, 
Nasliville, Tennessee, February 2G, 18(12. 
General Orders No. 13a.] 

The General Commanding congratulates his troops that it has been 
their privilege to restore the national banner to the Capital of Tennessee. 
He believes that thousands of hearts in every part of the State will swell 
with joy to see that honored flag reinstated in a position from which it was 
removed in the excitement and folly of an evil hour; that the voice of her 
own people will soon proclaim its welcome, and that their manhood and 
patriotism will protect and perpetuate it. 

The General does not deem it necessary, thoxigh the occasion is a fit one, 
to remind his troops of the rule of conduct they have hitherto observed 
and are still to pursue. We are in arms, not for the purpose of invading 
the rights of our fellow-countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integ- 
rity of the Union, and protect the Constitution under w^hich its people 
have been prosperous and happy. We cannot, therefore, look with indif- 
ference on any conduct which is designed to give aid and comfort to those 
who are endeavoring to dei'eat these objects; but the action to be taken in 
such cases rests with certain authorized persons, and is not to bo assumed 
by individual ofllicers or soldiers. Peaceable citizens are not to be molest- 
ed in their persons or property. Any wrongs to either are to be prouijjtly 



69 

corrected and the oifenders brought to punishment. To this end all per- 
sons are desired to make complaint to the immediate commander of officers 
or soldiers so oifending, and if justice be not done promptly, then to the 
next commander, and so ou until the wrong is redressed. If the necessi- 
ties of tlie public service should require the use of private property for 
public purposes, fair compensation is to be allowed. No such appropriation 
of private property is to be made except by the authority of the highest com- 
mander present, and any other oificer or soldier who shall presume to ex- 
ercise such privilege shall be brought to trial. Soldiers are forbidden to 
enter the residences or grounds of citizens on any plea without authority. 

No arrests are to be made without the authority of the Commanding- 
General, except in case of actual offense against the authority of the Gov- 
ernment ; and in all such cases the fact and circumstances will immedi- 
ately be reported in writing to headquarters through the intermediate 
commanders. • 

The General reminds his officers that the most frequent depredations 
are those which are committed by worthless characters who straggle from 
the ranks on the plea of being unable to march ; and where the inability 
really exists, it will be found in most instances that the soldier has over- 
loaded himself with useless and unauthorized articles. The orders already 
published on this subject must be enforced. 

The condition and behavior of a corps are sure indications of the effi- 
ciency and fitness of its officers. If any regiment shall be found to disre- 
gard that propriety of conduct which belongs to soldiers as well as citizens, 
they must not expect to occupy the posts of honor, but may rest assured 
that they will be placed in positions where they cannot bring shame on 
their comrades and the cause they are engaged in. The Government sup- 
plies with liberality all the wants of the soldier. The occasional depriva- 
tions and hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with patience 
and fortitude. Any officer Avho neglects to provide properly for his troops, 
or separates himself from them to seek his own comfort, will be held to a 
rigid accountability. 

By command of General Buell. 

James B. Fry, A. A. G., Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Army of the Ohio, | 
Field of SM/oh, Tenn., April 8, 1862. j 
General Orders No. 6.] 

The General congratulates the army under his command on the imper- 
ishable honor won yesterday by a portion of it on the battlefield of Shiloh, 
near Pittsburg Landing. The alacrity and zeal with which they pressed 
forward by forced marches to the succor of their comrades of a sister army 



70 

imperiled by the attack of an overwhelming force; the gallantry with 
which they assaulted the enemy; and the persevering courage with which 
they maintained an incessant conflict against superior numbers from six 
o'clock in the morning until evening, when the enemy was driven from the 
field, are incidents which point to a great service nobly performed. 

The General reminds his troops again that such results are not attained 
by individual prowess alone; that subordination and careful training are 
essential to the efficiency of every army; and that the success which has 
given them a brilliant page in history is greatly due to the readiness with 
which they have seconded the labors of their division, brigade and regi- 
mental commanders, who first disciplined them in camp, and then led them 
judiciously and gallantly in battle. 

By command of Major-General Buell. 

James B. Fry, A. A. G., Chief of Stafi". 

Headquarters Army op the Ohio, October 12, 18G2. 
General Orders^ No. 476.] 

The battle of Chaplin Hills, fought near Perryville, on the 8th 
instant, will stand conspicuous for its severity in the history of the rebel- 
lion. It deserves to be commemorated for the determined valor displayed 
by the portion of the army that was engaged. 

The principal force of the enemy, on chosen ground, under General 
Bragg, attacked our left wing as it was moving into position after a 
fatiguing march. The suddenness and strength of the attack, and the fall 
of two of their gallant leaders, Jackson and Terrill, caused some of the 
new troops of the Tenth division to fall into disorder, and threw the 
weight of the battle mainly on the Third division. This was subsequently 
reniforced by two brigades from the center corps, which itself had met 
with considerable opposition in moving into position. The enemy was 
repulsed with heavy loss, and, when the army advanced to the attack at 
six o'clock the following morning, was found to have retreated during the 
night. 

The good conduct exhibited by the troops on tliis field only realized 
that which the General has always confidently expected from them. For- 
tuitous circumstances, which so often afi"ect the incidents of war, screened 
the enemy from a combined effort of the different corps, until night inter- 
vened to prevent his defeat from terminating in the destruction of his 
army ; but the thanks of the General are not less due to the gallant 
officers and men under his command. In the battle, and on the march, 
the old troops have given the highest proofs of discipline and courage. 
The new troops already vie with them. Let them preserve order, remem- 
bering that lawlessness in an army is both disgraceful and fatal. The 



71 

saeredness and dignity of tlie cause for wliicli they are battling demand 
nothing less. The nation will mourn the loss of the heroes who fell at 
Chaplin Hills ; it will honor those who prove worthy to fill their places. 
By command of Major G-eneral Buell. 

James B. Fry, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Army of the Ohio, 
Louhrilh-, Ky., October 30, 1862. 
General Orders, No. 150.] 

In obedience to orders from the headquarters of the army, Major-General 
Buell relinquishes the command of the district and Army of the Ohio to 
Major-Geueral W. S. Rosecrans. 

It is impossible for the Greneral without feelings of regard and a warm 
interest in their futvire success, to part with troops whom he has been the 
instrument of converting for the most part from raw levies into a powerful 
army, honored by common consent for its discipline and efficient organiza- 
tion, for its csj^rit tie corps, and for victories unqualified by a single reverse; 
and whose fortunes he has followed for a twelve month over a field of 
operations embracing considerable portions of four States, through diffi- 
culties and dangers which its fortitude and courage have mastered without 
accident or failure. It has recently by a rapid march of some five nun- 
dred miles with limited subsistence, often with an inadequate supply of 
water, returned to Kentucky and driven from her borders a powerful 
army ; and having re-established its communications is now well on its 
way to meet the enemy at other points. The occasion is not convenient for 
recounting its services during the past twelve months, but the army may 
safely recur to them with pride. If any thing has not been accomplished 
which was practicable within the sphere of its duty, the General cheerfully 
holds himself responsible for the failure. 

The General reflects with pride that the army under his command has 
for the most part been free from petty jealousies and intriguef — that it has 
neither indulged in vain boasting, nor tarnished its high character by 
bickerings and low criminations. It will enhance his gratification if it shall 
carry to its new commander — who already has earned its confidence and 
respect by distinguished service — the same noble qualities which have 
characterized it since its organization. He will pray that it may be the 
instrument of speedily restoring the Union to its integrity ; and there is 
no individual in its ranks in whose honor and welfare he will not feel a 
special interest. 

By command of Major-General Buell. 

James B. Fry, Colonel and Chief of Staff. 



ERRATA. 

Page 10, sixth line, fifth word, read "that" instead of "the." 
Page 11, fifteenth line, read "June" instead of "April." 
Page 13, fifteenth line, read " Tennessee " instead of " Mississippi." 
Page 46, seventh line, omit "of the enemy." 

D. C. BUELL. 



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